254 CONSCIOUSNESS AND EXPERIENCE 



we assume states of consciousness as existences by 

 themselves. As recent psychology testifies, we 

 again have to resort to conditions that have no 

 place nor calling on the basis of the theory the 

 principle of habit, of neural action, or else some 

 connection in the object. 1 



We have only to note that there are two oppos 

 ing schools in psychology to see in what an un 

 scientific status is the subject. We have only to 

 consider that these two schools are the result of 

 assuming states of consciousness as existences per 

 se to locate the source of the scientific scandal. 

 No matter what the topic, whether memory or 

 association or attention or effort, the same dual 

 isms present themselves, the same necessity of 

 choosing between two schools. One, lost in the dis 

 tinctions that it has developed, denies the func 

 tion because it can find objectively presented only 

 states of consciousness. So it abrogates the func 

 tion, regarding it as a mere aggregate of such 

 states, or as a purely external and factitious re- 



1 It may avoid misunderstanding if I anticipate here 

 a subsequent remark: that my point is not in the least that 

 &quot; states of consciousness &quot; require some &quot; synthetic unity &quot; 

 or faculty of substantial mind to effect their association. 

 Quite the contrary ; for this theory also admits the &quot; states 

 of consciousness &quot; as existences in themselves also. My 

 contention is that the &quot;state of consciousness&quot; as such is ! 

 always a methodological product, developed in the course 

 and for the purposes of psychological analysis. 



