258 CONSCIOUSNESS AND EXPERIENCE 



viction of the value of the individualized finds its 

 further expression in psychology, which undertakes 

 to show how this individualization proceeds, and in 

 what aspect it presents itself. 



Of course, such a conception means something 

 for philosophy as well as for psychology ; possibly 

 it involves for philosophy the larger measure of 

 transformation. It involves surrender of any claim 

 on the part of philosophy to be the sole source 

 of some truths and the exclusive guardian of some 



at issue, but to have weakened my own point, as this doc 

 trine seems to offer a special vantage ground whence to 

 defend the close relationship of psychology and philosophy. 

 The &quot; narrowing,&quot; if such it be, will have to pass from 

 limits of time and other matters. But the other point 

 I cannot concede. The independently existing soul restricts 

 and degrades individuality, making of it a separate thing 

 outside of the full flow of things, alien to things experi 

 enced and consequently in either mechanical or miraculous 

 relations to them. It is vitiated by just the quality already 

 objected to that psychology has a separate piece of reality 

 apportioned to it, instead of occupying itself with the 

 manifestation and operation of any and all existences in 

 reference to concrete action. From this point of view, the 

 &quot; states of consciousness &quot; attitude is a much more hopeful 

 and fruitful one. It ignores certain considerations, to be 

 sure; and when it turns its ignoring into denial, it leaves 

 us with curious hieroglyphics. But after all, there is a key; 

 these symbols can be read; they may be translated into 

 terms of the course of experience. When thus translated, 

 selfhood, individuality, is neither wiped out nor set up as a 

 miraculous and foreign entity; it is seen as the unity of 

 reference and function involved in all things when fully 

 experienced the pivot about which they turn. 



