270 CONSCIOUSNESS AND EXPERIENCE 



carries the verified and solid body of the one into the 

 large and free form of the other. 



[NOTE: I have let this paper stand much as written, though 

 (now conscious that much more is crowded into it than could 

 properly be presented in one paper. The drift of the ten 

 years from 99 to 09 has made, I venture to believe, for in 

 creased clearness in the main positions of the paper: The 

 revival of a naturalistic realism, the denial of the existence 

 of &quot; consciousness,&quot; the development of functional and 

 dynamic psychology (accompanied by aversion to interpre 

 tation of functions as faculties of a soul-substance) all of 

 these tendencies are sympathetic with the aim of the paper. 

 There is another reason for letting it stand: the new func 

 tional and pragmatic empiricism proffered in this volume 

 has been constantly objected to on the ground that its con 

 ceptions of knowledge and verification lead only to sub 

 jectivism and solipsism. The paper may indicate that the 

 identification of experience with bare states of consciousness 

 represents the standpoint of the critic, not of the empiricism 

 criticised, and that it is for him, not for me, to fear the 

 subjective implications of such a position. The paper also 

 clearly raises the question as to how far the isolation of 

 &quot; consciousness &quot; from nature and social life, which charac 

 terizes the procedure of many psychologists of to-day, is 

 responsible for keeping alive quite unreal problems in phi 

 losophy.] 



