272 THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE 



turn away to more fertile fields. The interest 

 shows signs of exhaustion. 



Students of philosophy will recognize what I 

 mean when I say that this growing conviction of 

 futility and consequent distaste are associated with 

 the outcome of the famous dictum of Kant, that 



I perception without conception is blind, while con 

 ception without perception is empty. The whole 

 course of reflection since Kant s time has tended to 

 justify this remark. The sensationalist and the 

 rationalist have worked themselves out. Pretty 

 much all students are convinced that we can reduce 

 knowledge neither to a set of associated sensations, 

 nor yet to a purely rational system of relations of 



rthought. Knowledge is judgment, and judgment 



| requires both a material of sense perception and 

 an ordering, regulating principle, reason ; so much 

 seems certain, but we do not get any further. 

 Sensation and thought themselves seem to stand 

 out more rigidly opposed to each other in their 

 own natures than ever. Why both are necessary, 



, and how two such opposed factors cooperate in 

 bringing about the unified result of science, be 

 comes more and more of a mystery. It is the 

 continual running up against this situation which 

 accounts for the flagging of interest and the desire 

 to direct energy where it will have more outcome. 



This situation creates a condition favorable to 

 taking stock of the question as it stands; to in- 



