THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE 273 



quiring what this interest, prolonged for over three 

 centuries, in the possibility and nature of knowl 

 edge, stands for; what the conviction as to the 

 necessity of the union of sensation and thought, 

 together with the inability to reach conclusions re 

 garding the nature of the union, signifies. 



I propose then to raise this evening precisely 

 this question : What is the meaning of the problem 

 of knowledge? What is its meaning, not simply 

 for reflective philosophy or in terms of epistemol- 

 ogy itself, but what is its meaning in the historical 

 movement of humanity and as a part of a larger 

 and more comprehensive experience? My thesis 

 is perhaps sufficiently indicated in the mere taking 

 of this point of view. It implies that the abstract- 

 ness of the discussion of knowledge, its remoteness 

 from everyday experience, is one of form, rather 

 than of substance. It implies that the problem of 

 knowledge is not a problem that has its origin, its 

 value, or its destiny within itself. The problem is 

 one which social life, the organized practice of man 

 kind, has had to face. The seemingly technical and 

 abstruse discussion of the philosophers results from 

 the formulation and statement of the question. 



I suggest that the problem of the possibility of 

 knowledge is but an aspect of the question of the 

 relation of knowing to acting, of theory to prac 

 tice. The distinctions which the philosophers raise, 

 the oppositions which they erect, the weary tread- 



