THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE 361 



is aware of his own intrinsic relations to truth, 

 and who glories in his ability to carry civilization 

 not merely to carry it, but to carry it on. 

 Thus another swing in the rhythm of theory and 

 practice begins. 



How does this concern us as philosophers? For 

 the world it means that philosophy is henceforth 

 a method and not an original fountain head of 

 truth, nor an ultimate standard of reference. But 

 what is involved for philosophy itself in this 

 change? I make no claims to being a prophet, 

 but I venture one more and final unproved state 

 ment, believing, with all my heart, that it is justi 

 fied both by the moving logic of the situation, and 

 by the signs of the times. I refer to the growing 



(transfer of interest from metaphysics and the the 

 ory of knowledge to psychology and social ethics 

 including in the latter term all the related concrete 

 social sciences, so far as they may give guidance 

 to conduct. 



There are those who see in psychology only a 

 particular science which they are pleased to term 

 purely empirical (unless it happen to restate in 

 changed phraseology the metaphysics with which 

 they are familiar). They see in it only a more 

 or less incoherent mass of facts, interesting be 

 cause relating to human nature, but below the natu 

 ral sciences in point of certainty and definiteness, 

 as also far below pure philosophy as to con.pre- 



