5 



cobwebs in the air; a man whose vision is, as we say, perfect, 

 pronounces the atmosphere to be clear, and that there are no 

 motes, insects, or cobwebs in it at all. Are there then spots, 

 cobwebs, &c. in the air because our man with the disordered 

 retina is conscious of theml We, who have the accustomed vision, 

 say, no ; but our evidence of the two is the weaker, it is that there 

 are no motes, &c. in the air because we do not see them. Now 

 if our testimony of the existence of an external be correct, viz. 

 that we are conscious of the existence of such external (and we 

 can cite no higher testimony), then it is also true that there are 

 motes, &c. in the air, for their existence rests upon the same 

 evidence which we admit, viz. that there is a consciousness of their 

 existence. 



7. Thus then the difficulty stands: those things which we 

 see, feel, hear, &c. are true respectively, because we are conscious 

 of them; while there are also things, the cognizance of which 

 belongs to the faculties of seeing, feeling, hearing, &c. and of 

 which we are also conscious, but which are nevertheless not true. 

 The real nature of truth cannot be altered by this apparent con- 

 tradiction ; for nothing can be plainer than that, if truth is con- 

 sciousness, consciousness must be truth. 



8. But, it may be said, we suffer conviction, or consciousness, 

 to be a test of truth only, in those instances in which such convic- 

 tion is immutable. I ask again, what is the proof of truth in the 

 immutable instances? It must still be replied, consciousness. 

 Then if that of which we are conscious is true in one instance, 

 why is it not true in another? The cases are identical; for if con- 

 sciousness is truth, and there is no example of truth, which is not 

 established by consciousness, how can we reject as false, that which 

 is itself truth? 



9. It is said that conviction proves a truth only, when it is 

 uniform or immutable with respect to the object. This distinction 

 is generally allowed: but the distinction is an artificial one. The 

 natural testimony of truth is consciousness, conviction, or belief; 

 and that, in nature, must necessarily be always true, which we 

 believe, or of the existence of which we are conscious. The 

 artificial testimony of truth is founded upon the consent of man- 

 kind, by which truth itself, or consciousness, is sometimes rejected 

 as false. Our present business is with natural truth. 



10. A man whose arm is paralyzed puts it into water of 130 

 degrees of heat, and he says the water is not warm : he immerses 

 the other arm in the same water, and he is ready to affirm that it 

 is hot. A person who has taken a dose of laudanum may wake in 

 the night, and see the head of an ox between the curtains: he may 

 recollect himself, and by the testimony of some other sense con- 

 vince himself that he is awake; still he sees the head of the ox, his 

 eyes fixed and flaming upon him: presently he sees the head 

 recede gradually, and perhaps disappear. His conviction in this 

 case was unequivocal ; yet the next day he rejects this testimony 



