10 



^ 23. There is a vulgar axiom which says " seeing is believing ;" 

 so also is tasting, bearing, feeling, &c. It is plain that things 

 which are perceived by the senses become objects of belief. 

 Belief, produced by an impression upon the senses, is rarely 

 superseded by a different belief with respect to the same object, 

 the relation of the senses with the external world being more 

 uniform and less complicated than that of the understanding. 

 But in sensible matters we are apt to believe more than the senses 

 inform us of; and as it passes under the authority of sensible 

 evidence, in this way the infallibility of the senses is brought 

 under question, and perhaps into disgrace. Thus a man, who, for 

 the first time, should see a shadowy representation of men on 

 horseback, would believe them (his judgment not being otherwise 

 instructed) to be men and horses of flesh and blood ; and he 

 would fancy that he believed no more than his senses informed 

 him of. It would scarcely occur to him that he did not see the 

 solidity of these men and horses, or their warmth, or their organiza- 

 tion, or the character in some other respects by which they are 

 identified. But our inexperienced man connects all these latter 

 particulars (whose only relation is with another sense) with that 

 which he sees, or with the effects produced on his faculty of vision, 

 and he would quote the perception of this sense, as the testimony 

 of these particulars. This distinction brings us up to the other 

 mode of acquiring a belief, which we propose to consider: the 

 first has been mentioned above ; but lest by this digression it 

 should be forgotten^ we will repeat, that the first mode of acquiring 

 a belief of the present existence of things, is by the influence which 

 related externals exert upon the senses. 



24. The second mode of acquiring a belief of a present 

 existence, is by a process of the mind termed an inference, the 

 foundation of which is resemblance. The general nature of this 

 evidence may be thus briefly exemplified : a person who should 

 be shewn a black fluid in a bottle, having the taste, the smell, 

 the appearance, and in the common use of ink, would conclude 

 the fluid to be mere ink; and under this belief it would be no 

 great matter of apprehension with him to drink a tea-spoonful or 

 so to oblige a friend, who might assure him that ink was good for 

 his cough; he would, I say, from this resemblance to ink, the 

 composition of which he well knew* infer that the fluid was ink, 

 and might be taken in a small quantity with impunity. The ink, 

 however, may contain arsenic; it may be a black arsenical solu- 

 tion, instead of common ink. Again : a man who keeps a splendid 

 establishment, a fine equipage of carriages and servants, and is, 

 as people say, liberal in all his transactions, would be inferred to 

 be rich; because these are the signs of riches, or these demonstra- 

 tions resemble those of people, who, front a closer acquaintance 

 with their concerns which might amount to an experience, are 

 known to be rich. Yet our man with the equipage may be spend- 

 ing hjs last shilling, or possibly may not have a shilling to spend. 



