13 



but we shall not take this trouble, unless the probability of the 

 inference is clearly suggested; which will be judged of according 

 to the above estimate of probabilities. 



33. If we think that the evidence of an inference which, as 

 far as we know, is founded on an universal connection, merits the 

 appellation of proof, we must denominate that evidence which is a 

 direct result of an influence on the senses, perceptive, or sensible 

 testimony. The kinds of evidence may then be enumerated ac- 

 cording to their force, in the following order: 



1st. Perceptive evidence. 



2nd. Proof; or that founded on analogy, to which we know of no 

 exception. These two are almost equal in their degree, and gene- 

 rally produce unequivocal belief: the 



3rd. May therefore be called probable evidence ; as when the 

 analogy is rarely excepted against: thus designating this class of 

 inferential evidence by the term which has been employed to 

 denote the whole species. 



4th. Indicative evidence; as when the association inferred, is 

 more frequent than the absence of such association. 



5th. The evidence of possibility; when the connection or 

 association is known sometimes to occur. These three last, which 

 may be considered as different grades of presumptive evidence, 

 give rise to the diversities of opinion ; for as facts are pre-sup- 

 posed to be in opposition, so their comparison will be attended 

 with a different result, according as one or the other set of facts 

 is recollected. 



34. The estimate of probability in all its range is to be 

 made by a comparison of the frequency of association with that of 

 exception. We must also remember that our judgment i^ best 

 qualified to make a comparison between things with which it is 

 most familiar; things with the collaterals of which, with the circle 

 of whose connections, we are best informed, and have treasured up 

 the greatest number of facts; things, in short, of which we have the 

 most common and extensive experience. Thus we are better quali- 

 fied to estimate probabilities (or our inferred belief is less likely to be 

 superseded), with regard to events which occur in the world every 

 day, than with regard to things of which we have had but three 

 examples: for though two of these may be in favour of our 

 inference, yet if these examples were more common, we should 

 perhaps find, as we often do, by progressive acquaintance, that 

 such a preponderance was anomalous; that that which in our con 

 fined knowledge appeared to be an exception, was in truth the 

 most common order of occurrence. 



35. The object of seeking probable evidence, is to produce 

 a belief which comes as near as possible to that produced by 

 perceptive evidence : and the end of our examination of evidence 

 is, that we should not confuse the degrees of credit which are to 

 be assigned severally to propositions; but that we should think 

 according to the best rules we can devise, for making our opinions 



