20 



which are essential to identify this particle of matter. Take away 

 any one of these ; make our elementary particle thus much defi- 

 cient, and the dependence of this particle for its identity will also be 

 shewn to be upon its causes; for the same chymical property, sup- 

 posing it to be that of an alkali, may exist without solidity, or it 

 may exist with a different property of attraction, with altogether an 

 altered relation with other substances. The same may be said of 

 the gaseous elements: who has decomposed oxygen? yet is not 

 oxygen capable of maintaining flame, of producing acidity? It 

 possesses weight, it may assume a tangible or a visible form ; and 

 united with another element, with hydrogen, does it not constitute 

 combustion? and in another form, as that of water, does not the 

 same union prevent ignition, or counteract it, having taken place? 

 Do not all these operations exemplify different, numerous, pro- 

 perties of the same thing? and if one of these properties were taken 

 away, would not our elementary oxygen be something else ? would 

 it not want one property by which it is identified ? Who shall tell 

 me then that we have experience of an elementary particle? But I 

 rest not the argument upon this basis. I will even suppose there 

 are elements, five or six hundred elements, to our perception; and 

 will trust, as has been done, the proposition to the support which it 

 finds in the right of inference. 



18. Now if nothing can exist without a cause, it follows that 

 all things are effects. It also follows, that every thing which exists 

 is made by more than one cause ; a principle which if it can be made 

 clear, disposes very readily of oijr question about elementary 

 substances. 



19. What is a cause? The term implies a relation: it is that 

 which is capable of producing something different from itself, which 

 something is called an effect. This also is a relative term, it im- 

 plies that which results from the operation of a cause. 



20. What virtue is there in a cause which enables it tp pro- 

 duce something different from itself? a question well urged : why 

 truly, none. If a cause could produce an effect which is different 

 from itself, that in which the difference consists, if it be superadded 

 to the cause, must originate from non-entity : which is contrary to 

 our established principle. If it be only a part of a cause, some 

 properties having been abstracted, why then there is no act of pro- 

 duction; for that only i emails, and is tlje effect, which was before 

 produced. A single cause is no agent, it is an identity, but capable 

 of no transaction: for a thing cannot supply or confer what it does 

 not possess ; all it can supply is itself, or its own identity. How 

 then do effects comprise the cause, and still be something different 

 from the cause? 



21. As a single cause can produce nothing different from itself, 

 and as the effect, according to the relative signification of the word, 

 is more than the cause ; and as this difference cannot originate out 

 of ijon-entity ; so the difference must on these accounts be supplied 

 by something else. The effect then depeuds, not upon one, but 



