37 



employed, we will just, by way of experiment, examine the scheme 

 which must be acknowledged by those who admit them. But we 

 will not do this, without first bestowing a few thoughts upon the 

 converse of the principle, in order that they might be occasionally 

 compared as we proceed. 



3. If nothing can be without a cause, distinct from itself, or, in 

 other words, but by a process of causation, the agency of a first 

 cause is absolutely precluded. But the prevailing system supposes a 

 first cause. If it is asked how this world, those things which we 

 see around us, and we ourselves, came to exist! It will be replied, we 

 were created by the power of an intellectual being, who is selff 

 existent. In consonance with a system of natural evidence, founded 

 upon the preceding data, let us examine how much is implied by 

 this work of creation. 



4. Creation is another word for production. This world was 

 produced at a certain period, and until then did not exist, it is said. 

 Did then the intelligent being with whom this creation originated 

 supply the materials of the world? For we know that things are 

 made by their causes, however we may be at a loss to conceive 

 fiom whence these causes sprung. Did this universal artificer sup- 

 ply the materials of this world? If he did, then the materials must 

 have been included in him, must have been identified with him; 

 and the world (as an effect must exist in its elements, or in the 

 sources from which it is supplied, although in them its form is 

 perhaps not conspicuous), must have been coeval with its creator, 

 and consequently could not be produced de novo. If the materials 

 of this world were not supplied by an intelligent author, then 

 either it exists without them, or else they are furnished from some 

 other source, or in some other way. It does not exist without them ; 

 for we perceive these materials in all our analyses, and we presume 

 upon them and work with them every day, and almost in every act 

 of our lives. 



5. But, it will be said, the mistake lies in the examination of 

 the first question: it will be said, the things of this world do 

 not' exist without their materials or their parts; nor were these 

 materials co-existent and identified with their author, but they 

 came into existence at his command. What then, is a command an 

 oak, or a rock, or the sea, or a mountain, or a continent? No; but it 

 will be said, by a command these things were produced. In \vhat 

 manner produced? Our experience of a command is, that it can 

 produce nothing, or no effect, except in relation with something 

 else. Asa sole agent, a command is totally inefficient; but its effi- 

 cacy is powerful in a circle of relations, which it holds with cp- 

 temporary existences. The case we are considering supposes it to 

 be a sole agent, for it supposes its efficacy to have been exerted 

 before other things were made. The exclusive efficacy of a com- 

 mand is then to be examined; and what says our experience? A 

 command is something, a power is something, a virtue is something, 

 If they are nothing, they can do nothing : then they are confessedly 



