38 



something. Can that something be different from what it is? 

 Why, truly, no; a thing cannot be, and not be, what it is; it seem? 

 not allowing too much to say that a thing is what it is. This com- 

 mand, then, this power, this virtue, can they be different from what 

 they are, and still be the things themselves? Can they, without the 

 aid of any thing else, be at the same time a command, a power, a 

 virtue, an elephant, and a rhinoceros? Can they be any thing more 

 than themselves? No, it will be said ; but, in the stupidity of repeti- 

 tion, it may be urged again, they can produce something different 

 from themselves. How produce? It must be answered, because 

 there is such a command, there will be also the rhinoceros, or 

 an elephant, or the sea. Then a thing may do more than be itself; 

 and this too without possessing the properties or the materials by 

 which something different from itself is constituted. A thing is a 

 certain identity; it is an existence; it must remain that existence, 

 unless altered by something else, in which case the product will be 

 a mixture of identities ; but, left to itself, its only power, its only 

 faculty, is to exist as itself. What is the proof? Every example of 

 existence of which we are informed by our senses. Against so uni- 

 versal a testimony shall we indulge a supposition which is made 

 without any example, without any sanction from our experience? 

 There are two ways, which have been before stated (and which, to 

 obviate some false examples which might be cited, may here be 

 differently expressed), in which new forms arise. One, as when 

 certain parts or properties of an aggregate are separated, and ap- 

 pear as distinct effects; the other, as when two or more aggregates 

 combine to produce a distinct effect: whichever of these is the 

 mode of causation, the effect can in no instance be any thing more 

 than a modification of present existences, which, whether in sepa- 

 rating parts and properties, or uniting with parts or properties, 

 must still produce new forms. 



6. It is true, it must be replied by one who is neither a fool, 

 nor disingenuous, the argument is not without weight: but we are 

 led to embrace one difficulty for the purpose of obviating another, 

 which is to conceive an origin of things without referring their exis- 

 tence to the agency of that which is called a first cause. Perhaps 

 this supposed difficulty, which thus becomes an excuse for a belief 

 without natural evidence, may be an imaginary one: whether, or 

 how far we are necessarily obliged to accept it, has been before in 

 part shewn, and we shall have occasion for some further examina- 

 tion on these points. 



7. For the sake of stating the argument clearly, we will not 

 fear the danger of a little repetition. We will suppose a period 

 before this visible world was created: what existed at that time? 

 An intelligent and powerful principle, a designing author. Then 

 this intellectual being, by a volition, or by a virtue, as it is said, 

 produced this visible world. What do we know of a volition, what 

 is our experience of such a thing ? for all our thoughts must. 1 

 brought to this test. It is a mere volition, a mere desire: hovr 



