42 



syllogism of this kind, viz. it must be allowed that the sea is good, 

 so is this which is usually denominated a house, therefore a house 

 is the sea. This is in fact an assumption similar to thai above; it 

 is arguing the perfect identity of two things from an agreement in 

 one single quality, while there is a vast difference in all the other 

 properties which belong to and distinguish them. 



18. It appears then that the proposition, that all the pheno- 

 mena in nature are produced and regulated by an universal mind, 

 is founded upon the analogy between these productions of nature 

 and the productions of art, in which latter we experience the in- 

 fluence of mind to be concerned. This is the point of analogy: 

 but the inference upon this ground of analogy is liable to the ob- 

 jections before stated, the principal of which may be summed up 

 in the two following : 



1st. Mind produces volition: through this medium its con- 

 ceptions or designings are executed ; and we have no experience 

 of the efficacy of volition, except in its alliance with organic sub- 

 stances. Hence there is a dissimilarity between the subjects on 

 which the operation of mind, through volition, is experienced, and 

 those on which such operation is supposed, and an argument of an 

 analogy cannot well be founded on dissimilitude. 



2nd. It is inferred that mind is necessary to produce regular 

 phenomena, because those are disorderly which mind does not 

 produce. At the same time it is affirmed that all phenomena are 

 produced by mind: and if this is true, it must follow that no argu- 

 ment can be founded on the contrast between regular and con- 

 fused productions, or designed and chance productions, seeing 

 that of the latter we can have no possible examples. 



19. But if we find that this exposition has no better success 

 than to leave the point at issue still in doubt; if there are those 

 who will assume the title of arbitrators, and substitute affirmation 

 for proof, intending to carry the point by authority where some 

 sort of choice appears to be allowed them; we must then confess 

 that some further satisfaction is required; and, with a view to 

 obtain it, we have only to recur to a principle of causation in 

 order to put the present question upon the same footing as that 

 upon which the principle itself stands.. 



20. An act of causation, such an one to which may be at- 

 tributed contrivance, cannot take place, it is said, unless regulated 

 by a designing principle. But design itself, abstractedly, what is 

 necessary to its existence? what but the ideas of those things with 

 which it works, or for which it projects? and can these ideas pre- 

 exist their objects? We have in truth no example of it. Where- 

 ever we can contemplate the designing faculty, we perceive that 

 the objects themselves must exist before the corresponding ideas 

 can exist: that is to say, those things must first exist which furnish 

 the analogies, or models of design. This experience obtains in that 

 which we call invention, and is without an exception; have we 

 then a right to conclude against it? If we allow it force, and con- 



