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no people who have not the idea of some powerful and intelligent 

 being who governs the world? For the first question, it is sufficient 

 to remark, that there are such things as fictions, and in the same man- 

 ner as they arise might originate any notion, and consequently the 

 one we are considering ; the notion is formed by the combination 

 of ideas from sensible impressions, and by the assumption of 

 analogies. Thus much is sufficient to shew that the origin of a 

 notion is no proof of its truth, for by the same processes we are 

 originating notions, some false and some true, every day. And for 

 the second question, it is only to be observed, that if a fiction is 

 one to which human nature, from similarity of constitution, is 

 prone, it will be very likely to be an universal one, without being 

 the less a fiction. Thus in the more ignorant times, and now 

 among ignorant nations, spiritual agencies were perpetually oc- 

 curring in nature, and affecting the concerns of men : the influence 

 of the planets over certain affairs has likewise been a prevailing 

 fiction, which however is discredited by men of sense and reflec- 

 tion, because they find no evidence for the opinion ; and without 

 this support it is not consistent with their character to fill their 

 understandings with bad conceits, when the value they set upon 

 good ones is shewn by the pains they take to find them. Thus 

 much for the questions; I proceed to shew that the belief of some 

 universal governor is one which men must be prone to slide into 

 by an easy gradation from the common observance of causes. 



24. The notion of such an existence might arise out of the 

 almost intuitive assent to a principle which has hitherto appeared 

 to be the basis of a different argument: the principle is this, that 

 nothing can exist without a cause; and now for the application. 

 It is observed, that things do not make themselves: this observa- 

 tion disposes us to look for their causes. As one instance, we will 

 take a human bone (or any other bone), but, for the sake of pre- 

 cision, a human tibia: what produces it, what constitutes it? It 

 will be replied, a bone is made by the union of phosphate of lime, 

 phosphate of magnesia, carbonate of lime, sulphate of lime, gela- 

 tine, fat, and cartilage; blood-vessels, &c. exist in bone, and our 

 tibia has a certain arrangement. Now urge the question further, 

 which is very natural, and ask what determines this arrangement? 

 We are not acquainted with the agents, and therefore supposing 

 the necessity of a cause, as observed above, we say, GOD. Again, 

 the phosphate of lime, if first detected in bones, would be con- 

 sidered a simple substance: if it should, during this opinion, be 

 asked how this phosphate of lime came to be? still retaining the 

 necessity of some cause, it would be replied, it was created by 

 GOD. But another step of analysis would give rise to a different 

 reply ; for when the two materials of which this substance con- 

 sisted were known, the question, how it came to be, would be 

 answered, " by the union of lime and phosphoric acid/' Every 

 example tends to shew that a Divine agency is assigned to begin 

 where analysis, or the knowledge of causes, ends. Thus it happens 



