48 



we say of the order of its parts? It would be said of them, they 

 want order altogether. If it is inquired why they want order? it 

 must be answered, their relation is not to indicate time correctly. 

 But in this reply we make some addition to our first proof of 

 order, viz. that which says it is the relation of parts with a certain 

 end, for the parts, &c. of our lying watch have a relation with a cer- 

 tain end, viz. with that which they accomplish. It is not, then, the 

 arrangement of parts, agreeably to any purpose which constitutes 

 order; but agreeably to the purpose we desire, regard, or like best. 

 34. We say then that is orderly and regular which suits our 

 convenience, or which pleases us. And is this any deviation from 

 the other processes of causation which we do not call orderly and 

 regular? Let us see. Certain things have such a relation with us 

 as to please or suit us; other things, acknowledging other rela- 

 tions, perhaps displease or do not suit us: what is there in either 

 instance but a common act of causation? The causes which we 

 dislike, perfect something else, or agree with another end; those 

 which we like, are equally disagreeable in another relation; there 

 is in both instances an order or concurrence, the same in charac- 

 ter, but the instances (or the causes) are themselves different ; and 

 very naturally, and very orderly, belong to different purposes. 



35. But order, it may be said, is exhibited wherever there 

 are any traces of method, whatever may be the end produced. 

 And what is method but an arrangement for specific effects? 

 And what effects ever do result from an arrangement, whether of 

 the sands upon the sea-shore, or of the fibres of a leaf, which is not 

 equally specific in regard to them? 



36. It appears, then, if by the word " order" is meant the 

 subserviency of parts to an end, that " order" must obtain in every 

 process of causation ; since it is the peculiar or inevitable business 

 of causes to produce an end. If by the word " order" is meant a 

 similitude to the works of art, this similitude exists but partially ; 

 and the reason why it exists at all is that certain specimens only 

 of the works of nature are so related with our faculties as to in- 

 duce imitation, and to furnish the models: we shall not, however, 

 be able to discover a difference of character between those wor!;s 

 of nature which have certain points of resemblance with our imi- 

 tations, and the universal results of causation. The difference is 

 in the end, not in the character; for the most that can be said of 

 the parts in either instance is that they concur, or are subservient 

 to the end. It is plain that the distinction implied by the words 

 order and confusion is arbitrary. If the materials which make a 

 man should be so arranged as to make a pig, we should say that 

 the arrangement was disorderly for making a man, but quite 

 orderly for making a pig. 



37. The same is to be observed of perfection, which is also a 

 relative term. Every identity must be perfect, because it is itself. 

 In this sense there ^is a positive perfection: if the thing were 

 changed, it would be imperfect compared with that which it was 



