50 



tance. But suppose that man had never been? why then his 

 materials would have been otherwise combined, and they would 

 then have held true relations, though different from those which 

 they now acknowledge. In saying thus much with respect to man, 

 J am anticipating another part of the subject. Our business is not 

 to conjecture whether things may be changed for the advantage of 

 man; but to gain a rational understanding of how things exist as 

 they are, and to what forces are to be assigned the determination of 

 existences. 



40. If it should be said, although in another state of things 

 there must be the order or relation between causes and effects, yet 

 things may nevertheless be very disorderly; the active principles 

 may be for ever changing the form of the passive materials, there 

 would be no stability, no permanency: I reply, if stability and 

 permanency are necessary to order, then it now exists but partially ; 

 for combinations are now perpetually shifting their forms, changing 

 their alliances; and man himself, all confident and important as he 

 appears, is but the creature of a day. 



41. Granting, then, that agreement exists now, and must exist, 

 under every form, it remains that we should examine to what this 

 agreement is to be attributed, either in the acknowledged, or in the 

 apparently objectionable instances. 



42. The senses can instruct us a considerable way in the solu- 

 tion of this question; common inferences will instruct us still fur- 

 ther; and the principles before mentioned, will leave us but little to 

 expect from further investigation. Thus, a clock would be no 

 clock without the wood, brass, &c. of which it is composed. What 

 makes the wood and the brass? Causes of which chymistry can 

 perhaps shew us one division. And what makes these? Other 

 causes which analysis has not reached. But these parts require ar- 

 rangement? True, this is necessary to the identity of a clock. 

 And how is this arrangement acconiplished ? In the usual way of 

 causation; thus, from a relation of agency between the hands of 

 man (as causes) and the brass, and wood, ^c. And how is such a 

 precise arrangement formed? By a relation between the muscles 

 and volition (as causes). And how is such a particular series of 

 volition determined upon? By the designing faculty. And what 

 produced this? An intellectual predisposition instructed, or made 

 the designing faculty which it is (from whence results this particu- 

 lar act of design), by the causes or things which surround it, and 

 with which it is related. But what made this intellectual predis- 

 position? Causes not analysed. (Ex nihilo nihil, #c.) 



43. Now if it be inquired what determines the universe to be 

 orderly or disorderly? what makes it such as it is, or what would 

 make it different? I reply, causes. I repeat the manner of causation : 

 it is this : things are certain forms of existence ; they remain separate, 

 and are contemplated as effects ; they unite with others, and become 

 causes; the materials of their original state are not lost when 



