231 



26. TliHs the fluid which supports life attains the seat of 

 life. This seat we have hitherto spoken of generally : the minuter 

 view which we are now taking requires that it should be con- 

 sidered more particularly. 



27. We have said, generally, that the spirit exists in the tex- 

 tures, and that its distinct constitutions, or those which manifest 

 diversity of properties, have their respective spheres. Is it then, 

 it will be inquired, meant to be affirmed that the properties which 

 we have denominated spiritual (or an aggregate of them which we 

 have called the spirit) occupy space] This question involves the 

 old dispute about materialism. The question whether all things 

 are material, is readily decided, when it shall be understood what 

 we agree to call matter. Matter is commonly agreed to consist of 

 an assemblage of properties ; and this very necessity of an assem- 

 blage of properties, to constitute matter, proves that there are 

 existences which are not material, namely, those identical proper- 

 ties individually, by which, collectively, matter is constituted. 

 But if the question whether all things are material, is so readily got 

 rid of, there h another which might be proposed as allied to it 

 which cannot be decided so promptly, viz. Is there any form of 

 existence which is not extended? and which, though it wants 

 tangibility, and is not an object of any other sense, does not occupy 

 space? If this question cannot be deckled, although I think by 

 a hmg discussion in conformity with our doctrines of causation it 

 raight be decided ; if then, I will say, this question cannot be 

 readily decided, we need not regret the difficulty of its decision, 

 so far as respects its connexion with our present subject, for either 

 of the alternatives into which it might be resolved will alike answer 

 the purpose to which it might here be applied. The alternatives are, 



1st, That constitutions denominated spiritual may pervade 

 substances and exist in solid particles, or have their sphere in a 

 place filled by matter; or, 



2nd, That matter is composed of infinitely divisible particles, 

 which have corresponding infinitely minute interstices; that 

 spiritual properties may occupy partially or wholly the interstices 

 of particles, and thus pervade aggregate masses and become related 

 with every portion of their solid contents without adding any 

 thing to their bulk. It is implied by this supposition that the 

 particles composing solid bodies nre not in actual contact. Now 

 though I have said that one of these two alternatives must be 

 adopted, and that either is good enough for nay purpose, yet I feel 

 inclined to bestow another paragraph or two, in the way of di- 

 gression, upon the choice of alternatives. 



28. The argument against spiritual existence, as meant to 

 imply the existence of something which has no property of matter, 

 and among others does not occupy space, arises from our having 

 so imperfect an experience of such existences; that is, they are 

 not objects which anyone sense is fitted to perceive: such at least 

 is a prevailing atsertkm. But to me it appears that we may quote 



