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, 



the evidence of the senses in proof of the existence of such pro- 

 perties. Thus, those things which are seen and fell are known to 

 be bodies, and to occupy or fill a place in which no other bodies 

 can exist at the same time: of such bodies we have an experience 

 by two senses, but a third sense will afford us just the same evi- 

 dence of properties which do not possess the above characters ; 

 that is, a third sense is related with properties which we can 

 neither see nor feel, and which, admitting the sufficiency of the 

 eye and touch to distinguish all things visible and tangible, must 

 be allowed to have neither bulk nor solidity, nor to fill a space. 

 Thus sound is, according to the test of those senses whose business 

 it is, or which are adapted, to discriminate matter or extended sub- 

 stances; sound, according to this test, must want altogether the 

 characteristics of matter, or extended substance, because it is 

 neither seen nor felt. Thus, also, flavours and odours are proper- 

 ties of which we have an evidence as satisfactory, an experience as 

 unequivocal, as we enjoy with respect to the objects of vision and 

 touch. Yet are flavours and odours not extended, or capable of 

 filling space, according to the testimony of the senses which take 

 account of those things which are extended, and which do 

 fill space. 



29. The chief difficulty of admitting the existence of spiritual 

 or purely immaterial existences proceeds from the limited ac- 

 quaintance we have with them, and from the great familiarity 

 which we hold with their opposites, viz. with matter in all its forms. 

 We have senses which take cognizance of immaterial, as the eye 

 and touch do of material, existences; but the forms which the 

 former are fitted to recognise are those spiritual properties 

 making flavour, odour, sound, &c.; while the two other senses of 

 vision and touch, having a more extensive relation, are fitted to 

 perceive not one or two, but all, the forms of matter, and to witness 

 their operations upon each other. But if we are informed by the 

 senses that there are properties which do not bear the characters 

 of material, we are justified in inferring, when we witness effects 

 produced by causes which are equally destitute of the characters 

 of matter, that the causes producing such effects are of that 

 spiritual kind of which we have some examples furnished by the 

 senses of taste, smell, and hearing; but which are nevertheless not 

 objects of these senses, simply because they constitute neither 

 flavour, odour, nor sound ; but agree with these in not being visible 

 or tangible, and, so far as this analogy goes, must be inferred to 

 be of the same kind. 



30. But it will be urged, there is a still weightier objection 

 than any which has yet been proposed to the belief of spiritual 

 or not extended existences, viz. that these spiritual agents, as they 

 are called, operate upon matter: solid masses are variously affected 

 by them, &c. which it will be said we cannot conceive to happen 

 without contact, and contact implies a junction of surfaces. That 

 one thing cannot move another without contact is true, or appears to 



