g2 STATE LAND LAWS 



SEC. 88 RECLAIMED SHORELANDS. 



unreasonably interfere with the primary right of navigation : Van Siclen v. 

 Muir, 46 Wash. 38 ; Sequim Bay Canning Co. v. Bugge, 49 Wash. 127. 



The state is not a necessary party to an action for trespass on tide lands 

 held under lease : Sequim Bay Canning Co. v. Bugge, 49 Wash. 127. 



A state deed of tide lands for oyster cultivation, being absolute in form, 

 grants exclusive possession and the right to prevent strangers from passing over 

 the same by boat or otherwise, at any stage of the tide, and is not a substantial 

 impairment of the rights of the public in navigable waters or an interference with 

 the right of Congress to regulate interstate and international commerce : Palmer 

 v. Peterson, 56 Wash. 74. 



State's title to the beds and shores of navigable waters is in fee, to the ex- 

 clusion of all common law littoral and riparian rights : Muir v. Johnson, 49 

 Wash. 66 ; Bilger v. State, 63 Wash. 457 ; Eisenbach v. Hatfleld, 2 Wash. 236 ; 

 Brace & Hergert Mill Co. v. State, 49 Wash. 326 ; Grays Harbor Boom Co. v. 

 Lownsdale, 54 Wash. 83 ; Lownsdale v. Grays Harbor Boom Co., 54 Wash. 542 ; 

 State ex rel, Tesler v. Board, 2 Wash. 53O. 



A sale of the bed and shores of a navigable tidal slough confers no right to 

 totally Obstruct the navigation of such slough, since all tide lands are sold sub- 

 ject to the paramount rights of the public in the waters thereon : Dawson v. 

 McMillan, 34 Wash. 269 ; Judson v. Tidewater Lbr. Co., 51 Wash. 164. But see 

 Palmer v. Peterson, supra. 



The ownership of tide lands being absolute, where there is no intervening 

 harbor area, a drawbridge constructed over navigable waters by federal and 

 state authority must be operated so as not to obstruct a wharf on tide lands in 

 private ownership : Nor. Pac. R. Co. v. Slade Lbr. Co., 61 Wash. 195. 



An upland owner on navigable waters has no riparian rights where, in order 

 to reach the water, he must cross over tide or shore lands which the state 

 has sold to another : Lownsdale v. Grays Harbor Boom Co., 54 Wash. 542 ; 

 Chlopeck Fish Co. v. Seattle, 64 Wash. 315. 



Whether any title is acquired in lands sold for oyster culture below the 

 lower boundary of second class tide lands is a question which cannot be raised 

 by the tide land owner : Pearl Oyster Co. v. Heuston, 57 Wash. 533. 



The purchaser or lessee of state tide lands is entitled to the exclusive pos- 

 session of the shellfish imbedded therein : Sequim Bay Canning Co. v. Bugge > 

 49 Wash. 127. 



And to seaweed growing or stranded thereon : Opinions Att'y Gen'l, '11-'12> 

 p. 272. 



A littoral owner upon a navigable lake is not entitled to the removal of a 

 houseboat moored in navigable water in front of his lands, either as an ob- 

 struction affecting his littoral rights or as a trespass constituting a nuisance, 

 since only the state can object thereto : Van Siclen v. Muir, 46 Wash. 38 ; Muir 

 v. Johnson, 49 Wash. 66. 



Prior to the amendment of sec. 59, supra, by act of 1911, a sale of second 

 class tide lands conveyed no lands below the line of mean low tide : Pearl 

 Oyster Co. v. Heuston, 57 Wash. 533. 



The upper boundary of tide and shore lands is the line of ordinary high tide 

 or water within the banks, except where the government meander line of the 

 uplands was run below such line and the uplands according to such survey pat- 

 ented prior to statehood, in which case the meander line is the upper boundary r 

 Washougal etc. Transp. Co. v. Dalles Nav. etc. Co., 27 Wash. 470. See cases 

 cited in note to sec. 2, Art. XVII, Const., ante. 



SEC. 88. SHORE LANDS BOUNDARIES EXTENDED RECESSION 

 OF WATERS. 



In every case where the State of Washington has heretofore 

 sold to any purchaser from the state any second class shore 



