PRIMITIVE MAN. 349 



to be a product of a less perfect structure improved 

 by natural selection, it would tben appear to be tbe 

 " result of a method of trial and error worked by un- 

 intelligent agents, as likely as of tbe direct application 

 of the means appropriate to that end, by an intelligent 

 agent." This is a bold and true assertion of the 

 actual relation of even this modified evolution to 

 rational and practical theism, which requires not 

 merely this God " afar off,^' who has set the stone of 

 nature rolling and then turned His back upon it, but a 

 present God, whose will is the law of nature, now as in 

 times past. The evolutionist is really in a position of 

 absolute antagonism to the idea of creation, even when 

 held with all due allowance for the variations of created 

 things within certain limits. 



Perhaps Paley's old illustration of the watch, as 

 applied by Huxley, may serve to show this as well 

 as any other. If the imperfect watch, useless as a 

 time-keeper, is the work of the contriver, and the 

 perfection of it is the result of unintelligent agents 

 working fortuitously, then it is clear that creation and 

 design have a small and evanescent share in the 

 construction of the fabric of nature. But is it really 

 so ? Can we attribute the perfection of the watch 

 to ^' accidental material operations '^ any more than the 

 first effort to produce such an instrument ? Paley 

 himself long ago met this view of the case, but his 

 argument may be extended by the admissions and 

 pleas of the evolutionists themselves. For example, 

 the watch is altogether a mechanical thing, and this 



