PRIMITIVE MAN. 871 



— the dog, for example — and compare it witli the 

 least elevated condition of the human mind, as ob- 

 served in the child or the savage, we shall find that 

 even here there is something more than that ''im- 

 mense difierence in degree,^' which Darwin himself 

 admits. Making every allowance for similarities in 

 external sense, in certain instinctive powers and appe- 

 tites ; and even in the power of comparison, and in 

 certain passions and affections ; and admitting, though 

 we cannot be quite certain of this, that in these man 

 differs from animals only in degree; there remain 

 other and more important differences, amounting to 

 the possession, on the part of man, of powers not 

 existing at all in animals. Of this kind are— first, 

 the faculty of reaching abstract and general truth, 

 and consequently of reasoning, in the proper sense 

 of the term; secondly, in connection with this, the 

 power of indefinite increase in knowledge, and in 

 deductions therefrom leading to practical results; 

 thirdly, the power of expressing thought in speech; 

 fourthly, the power of arriving at ideas of right and 

 wrong, and thus becoming a responsible and free 

 agent. Lastly, we have the conception of higher spi- 

 ritual intelligence, of supreme power and divinity, and 

 the consequent feeling of religious obligation. These 

 powers are evidently different in kind, rather than in 

 degree, from those of the brute, and cannot be con- 

 ceived to have arisen from the latter, more especially 

 as one of the distinctive characters of these is their 

 purely cyclical, repetitive, and unprogressive nature. 



