CONTENTS. 



vu 



Animal, that is, Voluntary Motion — Ariflotle^s Opinion upon the Subject — Mind, 

 the Caufe of all Motion, according to the Definition of it Page 126 



CHAP. X. 



The Human and Brute Minds fpecifically different— If they be of different Speciefes, 

 there muft be fixed Boundaries betwixt them — Comparifon of the two — No Compa- 

 rifon betwixt us and the lowefl Kind of Animals — The Comparifon only betwixt us 

 and the higher Sort — Different Speciefes of Animals muft have different Minds — 

 Comparifon of our Senfes with thofe of other Animals — Two Differences betwixt 

 our Phantafia and that of the Brute — Difference htVNiyiX.om Comparative Faculty and 

 that of the Brute — One Clafs of the objects of Human Perception quite different 

 from thofe perceived by the Brute — Therefore the Faculty different. — Man recogni- 

 zes himfelf — The Brute not— Comparifon of the Oredic Powers of the Man and 

 Brute — ^Thofe of the Brute, being directed by Nature, do no hurt — Thofe of the 

 Man, being guided by Opinion, do a great deal — Summary of the Account of the 

 Human Mind, and of that of the Brute — The Error of our modern Philofophers in 

 confounding Ideas and Perceptions of Senfe — Objection that, though other Animals 

 have not the Ufe of Intelled, they may have the Faculty — That objedion anfwered 



p. 131 



CHAP. XL 



Plato's Notion of our Knowledge in this State exprefled by an Allegory— All derived 

 from Senfation — Such Knowledge moft Imperfed — This illuftrated by the Know- 

 ledge we get from the Senfe of Sight— What Intelka can do to fupply the Defeds 

 ol Senfe — The Knowledge of fuperior Minds very different from ours- What ours will 

 be when we are difincumbered of the Body—It will be fuch as is incredible to ihe 

 Material Philofophers — That the Mind has Perceptions in this State, even of fenfible 

 Objeds proved, from our Phantafia — from our Dreams — from Appearances to us 

 Tvhen awake— from the Cafe of thofe that walk in their Sleep— Inftances of thefc 

 Kinds— The Senfes not the Caufe of the Perception of Senfible Objcds— This illu- 

 ftrated by a Comparifon p. 14P 



C H A P. 



