4 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book I. 



MinJy therefore, pure ??imJf intirely feparate from body and 

 its attributes, is the proper liibjedl of the fcie'nce I call metaphyfics. 

 And here we may obfcrve the reafon of the name given by Ariftotle 

 to the books in -which he treats of this fcience ; thefe he. calls 

 ^^iTx T« (pvv.^x, or, as we have tranOated it, metaphyftcs^ im[)orting, 

 that the fubjccl of it is fornething tranfcendent, or beyond 'phy- 

 Jicsy and that the ftudy of it ftiould come in order after phy- 

 ftcs. For, it is evident, that, as in this Hate of our exiftence, 

 all our knowledge originates from our fenfes, we can have no idea of 

 pure m'lmU but by obferving its operations in body. The only foun- 

 dation, therefore, upon which metaphyfics can properly reft, is phyfics ; 

 the fubjedt of which, as I have faid, is a compound of body and mind. 



Thofe, 



>.<9t;, ^i) -Tr^nr-KaXut ri t»j vAjjj. And, with refpe£l to mathematics, he fays, they arc very 

 properly placed betwixt material qx phyfical entities, and immaterial ox divine^ as he calls 

 them, becaufe it is thro' them that we are to pafs from the former to the latter ; and, from 

 that ufe of them, they are called, he fays, ftuin^xTx^ as it is by them we are taught to 

 afcend from material things to immaterial and divine : Aias rovro yx^ xa:< /^ci^nuxrx m- 



yevrxtf en oh t«iit« fixv^xyovTxe kxi i&ic-hvTu? v««v xcu^xra^y uvxyicSui tTirt tx &h». And 



he gives us, upon this occafion, a very fine quotation from Plotinus, who fays, that 

 the youth fliould be taught mathematics, in order to accuftom them to the contem- 

 plation of immaterial natures ; for, if we were to pafs immediately from phyfics to 

 metaphyfics or theology, we fhould be dazzled and blinded, like thofe who come at 

 once out of a dark houfe into a great light. We ought, therefore, to (lay fome time 

 in a place moderately lighted, and from thenc. pafs into the great light. See a great 

 deal faid to the fame purpofe by Proclus in his commentary upon the firft book of 

 Euclid. This I would have obferved by our modern philofophers, who feem to va- 

 lue geometry too much for its own fake ; or, if they make any ufe of it, it is only 

 by applying it to hcdy. And, indeed, the whole of our natural philofophy at pre- 

 fent appears to be nothing more than the obfervation of the phaenomena of nature, 

 which I call natural hijiory.., not philofophy ; or the application of geometry to the 

 motion of bodies. But, fo far from making the ufe the antients made of it, to e« 

 levatethe mind to the contemplation of fuperior natures, I fufpe£l many of thofe phi- 

 lofophers do not believe that any fuch natures exift, and are fo much converfant with 

 extcujioa and its properties, as to imagine that nothing exills which is not ex- 

 tended. 



