Chap. II. A N T I E N T M E T A P H Y S I C S. 7 



boundaries geometry is the fcience, not body itfelf, which is what is 

 coatained within thole boundaries. The fame objection lies againft the 

 dehnition which makes body to be the fame with extenfion ; for a thing 

 is faid to be extended^ that confifts of parts which are co-exiftenc 

 and continuous, that is, have a common boundary ; and the three 

 dimenfions are but extenfion differently confidered, according to 

 the ditferent pofition of the parts, with rerpe(f^ to one another, 

 and to us. For extenfion, confidered as fituated before or behind, is 

 what we call length ; confidered as lying to the right or left of us, it 

 is breadth ; and confidered as going up or down, it is depth. Befides, 

 fpace is extended as well as body. The definition, therefore, is too 

 comprehenfive. But, on th^ other hand, the definition is not compre- 

 henfive enough, by which body is defcribed ' to be that which refifls, 

 * and is impenetrable.' For, according to the opinion of certain phi- 

 lofophers, there are fome fluids fo fubtle as to penetrate all bodies. We 

 muft therefore try whether we can find a definition oibody more com- 

 prehenfive, and more adapted to the nature of things as they actually 

 exiil, which, as I have faid, are the fubjecl of metaphyfics. It ought 

 alfo to be fuch, as to have a relation to 7nind. For, as the whole uni- 

 verfe confifts of body and 7mnd, and as thefe two are wonderfully 

 mixed together, in every part of nature, and in the material world, 

 according to my apprehenfion, never feparated, it is manifed that they 

 muft have a natural connection and relation one to another. Now, 

 there is, in all the par':s of the material and vifible world, a perpetual 

 uiOilon : For the celeiVial bodies move coaftantly in one refpecl or a 

 nother ; and all here below is in a continual viciditude of generation 

 and corruption, which cannot be without jnotion. Now, where tiiere 

 is motion, there muft be there fomething that moves. — What is moved, 

 I call body ; — What moves, I call mind. And this definition takes in 

 the opinion of all the phllofophers who believe that there is fuch a 

 thing in nature as ??nnd diftinQ from body : For thefe all agree that 

 mind is either mediately or imm^cdiately the caufe of all motion. /\nd, 

 as there is nothing in nature but bod^ and mind, that which is moved 

 muft necefl'arily be body. 



For 



