Chap. Iir. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 13 



CHAP. III. 



Of Moiion-^Things preparatory to the Defnition of Motion — Tijoo De- 

 finitions of it given by Arijlotle — One of them better than the other — 

 Not Defined by Modern Philofiophers^ — Nor by Plato — Arfiotle^s 

 Divi/ion of Motion — Platd*s Divifiion different — Compared ivith 

 that ofi Arifiotie's, both as to Matter and Style. 



TH O S E of our modern philofophers, who have not enlarged 

 their ideas by the ftudy of antient philofophy, will no doubt 

 be furprifed at this definition that I have given of mind. Such phi- 

 lofophers have no other idea of mind but as a thing which thinks 

 and reafons. But thofe who have been taught by the antients to re- 

 cognife the vegetable and animal^ as well as the ratiotial life, and who 

 have learned that there is in all natural bodies a principle of a^ivity, 

 which, according to Ariftotle, is nature itfelf, all the reft being no- 

 thing hntfidnjelejs ina6live matter; and who have alfo learned, tliat the 

 chief attribute of divinity is that of being ihtfirfl mover and author 

 of that motion by which the whole bufinefs of nature is carried on, 

 will judge very differently, and think that 1 could not have defined 

 mind by any property more charadcriftic of its nature than the poiver 

 of moving^ nor any more general, being common to all minds, from 

 the higheft to the loweft. 



As it is ncceffary that we Ihould know what motion is, in order to 

 underftand perfedly the nature both of boay and mind, I proceed 

 now to give a philofophical c-ccount ol it; without which there is no 

 fcicnce of metaphyfics, nor ony pcrfetfl: Tcience of r^atural philofophy; 

 tnction being the fole agent in all natural productions and operations 

 of every kind. Tuithcr, it is viotion that produces all the perceptions 



of 



