i8 A N T I E N T METAPHYSICS. Book 1. 



The firA kind of exigence, wl/ich, I know, will, by the unlearned 

 reader, be thought a mere Ihadovv, wiihout fubftance or reahty, is faid 

 by Ariiluile to be 6» hyxnc4, that is, in poiver or capacity. In this way 

 plants exiil in their feetis, animals in the embryo, works of art in the 

 idea of the artiil and the materials of which they arc made, and, 

 in general, evei^y • living in the caules which produce it. From 

 this power or capacity, there is a progrefs to energy^ or adual exift- 

 ence : So that here, in the produdion of things, we find, that there is 

 a progrefs from one thing to another, njiz. from a ftate of mere capacity 

 to a ftate of a^uality or energy*. — Again, as before we found, that there 

 was a progrefs from the ftate of maturity and perfedion of every thing 

 to its decay and difiblution ; and as, when the thing is come to its 

 maturity, it has the capacity of decaying and diflblving, the progrefs 

 thereto may be faid to be from a ftate of capacity to what we may 

 alfo call acluality or energy^ in as much as it is the end now propofed by 

 nature, as the maturity or perfedion of the thing was before. The pro- 

 grefs in both cafes is what I call motion ; and it now appears, that, in 

 both, the progrefs is from capacity to energy : And we are now 

 able to anfwer the queftion propofed above ; ' /ro?u tvhat^ and to 

 'what, motion is a change V For it is univerfally true of all motion, 

 that it is a change from capacity to energy ; becaufe every motion, 

 however irregular it may feem, and whether proceeding from nature, 

 or from the will and inclination of fome fenfitive being, has a ten- 

 dency to fome end ; which end, when attained, is denoted by the 

 yjovd energy: And it is equally certain, that the thing moved muft, 

 before it be moved, have the capacity or po'wcr of being moved. 



Having thus difcovered, that motion lies betwixt capacity and ener- 

 gy, it is evident, that it muft have a connedion with each of them ; 



and, 



• The progrefs towards a£lual exiftencc is expreflVd in Greek by the word y«»»T«<, 

 while the aaual exiftence is denoted by the word «^t«. Two wcrds of common ufe 

 among the Greek philofophers, but which can hardly be rendered into Engiifh. 



