20 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book L 



fcure ; and, by others, has been ridiculed as altogether without mean- 

 ing. But I hope that 1 have ihown, that it is taken from a compre- 

 henfive view of nature and art, and of every kind of generation and 

 produfti n *. And I defirc any one, who is not fatisfied with Arifto- 

 tle's definition, to try whether he can give a better ; and then he will 

 be convinced of the difficulty there is in defining a thing fo fhadowy 

 and unfubftantial, that it may be faid to be fomething betwixt the t» 

 ex and the t« ,«„<»», being and no being ; for what exifts only potentially^ 

 may be faid not to exifl at all. One thing is evident, that it is a de- 

 finition which has coft Ariftotle a great deal of pains, as appears from 

 his treating of it at great length, both in his Phyfics, lib, 3. and 

 in his Metaphyfics, lib. 1 3. cap. 9. "f. Our modern philofophers, 

 though they have been at great pains to inveftigate the laws of mo- 

 tion, have hardly thought it worth their while to tell us what motion 

 is ; for, as to the common definition of it, viz. change of place or fi- 

 tuation, that is not motion^ but the effe<ft of motion : For, I afk, How is the 

 place or fituation changed .'* and the anfwer can be no other than. By motion. 

 So that the queftion recurs, What is this fame motion^ by which not only 

 place and fituation are changed, but generation and corruption are pro- 

 duced, grovvth or decay, alteration of all forts, and, in fhort, every change 

 that can happen to body ? And, befides, it is not comprehenfive e- 

 nough, as it takes in only one kind of motion^ viz. that from place to 

 place. 



This 



* See this definition of Arifloile more fliortly explained in a note upon the 2d chap, 

 of the ifl book of the ifl vol of the Origin and Progrtfs of Language. 



t In this chapter, Ariftotle is at great pains to Ihow of howdifEcult definition it is. 

 It is not, fays he, capacity ^ it is not energy, it is not /)r/z;^//o;2, neither is it any of the 

 categories, fuch zsfubjlancey quantity, quality, reUti»n, &c. not being, like them, any cir- 

 cumfcribed or determined kind of being ; nor has it any fixed or permanent cxiftcnce 

 of any kind. Neither does it cxift all at once, but by fucceinon. Ann, after having 

 in this way told us all that it is not, he concludes in this way ; tJe-n Mytr», to Xi^h*, 



mmt Kcn tr||y««» xixi y.n fvl^yHMV rtji ti^iifctyr,y (that is what he Calls tvi^yitx -Vajj, v r the 



real exiftence of any thing), <^n» /*iy x*^^'^"* ithx»f<-*^»^ hayui. So that it is energy, 

 and /:o/encrgy, difficult to be feen or comprehended^ but pojfible to exiji- 



