32 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Eook L 



brings us back to the firft divifion I made of th'mgs into mind and 

 hody-t mind being always active^ body always pajjt'ue. 



Further, as there can be no generation or corruption without change, 

 every thing here below the moon mud, of neceflity, be in a conftant 

 viciflitude and fucceffion of one ftate to another. Change, therefore, 

 is a moft general idea, more general than even motion ; for all motion 

 is change, and, accordingly, we have made change the^^««j- of mo- 

 tion : But all change is not motion ; for there is a change from non- 

 exijience to exiftence, which is called ysvss-;?, ox generation) but which, 

 as I have already obferved, is not motion *. 



With refped to thofe changes made upon any thing, the fubftance 



ilill continuing the fame, it is to be obferved, that, if the change be 



from 



bliflied this work in his Opufcula Mythologica, very properly correds the tAct, p. 515. 

 by reading xitTrxhi, (a word, which is ufed by the fame author in a fragment of his 

 preferved by Stobaeus, inferted alfo by Gale in his Colle<Slion, page 538.)} for, with- 

 out that corre£lion, uTrnSn and «k«mtov would denote the fame thing; becaufe, what 

 is incapable of fuffering, is, by confcquencc", incapable of being moved: But he 

 carries his correction too far, when he changes xKt*nToi into eiHy.tvnroy, that word de- 

 noting what is always capable of being moved ; which is certainly not the meaning 

 of Ocellus Lucanus j for then again there would be no oppofition betwixt the two 

 principles. We muft, therefore, let the word «k/»iit«v ftand as it is, or, if we will 

 change it, it muft be into ««e<Jt(v;oT<x.«v j which, I am perfuaded, is the true reading in 

 the fragment above mentioned, of the fame author, in place of niiKivnToi ; fo that we 

 ought to read there, t« 01 xH>ctyr)TtKoy xv^zfvei, to ti xeiTrudii xvti^vHTxi ^ and fo thfi fenfe 

 cf both paflages will be the fame, viz that, in nature, there are two principles, the 

 one tbat always a^s, and never fuffers ; the other that never a^s^ but always Juffers ; 

 that is, in two words, mind and matter i which I apprehend to be the true fyll;>:m of 

 the univerfe, if we under ftand by matter ^ not body, that is, matter with its feveral 

 qualities of extenfion, refiftance, &c. •, but \.\\c Jirji m-Jter^ th;it is, matter vf:x\\out 

 any of thofe qualities, which, as we fliall fc.^ afterwards, was held in the Pythago- 

 rean fchooi to be one of the principles of nature. And what makes the divifion ivctwixt 

 thefe two principles of nature, is, according to our author, the ccurfc of the moon. \h;ch 

 he fays is the ifthmus betwixt immortality and generation. lo-d^f^e? yu^ ifIiv ctieivcctntt; 



X.XI yiiy,ciui o tti^i t«» c-tAn^viv o^cuoi. Ibid. 



* Ariftotle calls this chiiige t| tv),^ vTs-tKM^nvtu tt? Cz-eiai/^iver. Metaph\f. lib. 13. 

 chap. II. See alfo Philoponus in the paflage above quoted. See fuithei, Philopo* 

 nus's commentary upon the third chapter of the firft book of Ariftotle </«? ^mnui. 



