36 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book L 



There yet remains another 7ini'verfal to be confidered, more univer- 

 fal than any I have hitherto mentioned, viz. being ; for this is an idea 

 that applies to every thing v/hich exifts in any way, whether as fub^ 

 ftance or accident^ whether aSiually or potentially^ whether in the na- 

 ture of things, or only in our notions; for even what we call ent'm 

 rationis^ or fidions of our mind, fuch as a hippocentaur^ or inoiintain of 

 gold^ have a teing\ even negation ox privation have an exillence; nay, 

 according to Ariftotle, we can fay, that nothing has a being * In 

 fhort, wherever we can ufe the fubftantive verb is, there muft be fome 

 kind of bei7ig. 



It is not, however, all the kinds of being, that I have mentioned, 

 that are the fubjedt of metaphyfics; for, as I obferved before, nothing 

 is the fubjed of metaphyfics but things exifting in nature, either 

 aHually or potentially. And therefore, abftrad notions, which exift 

 only in the mind, have nothing to do with this fcience; (o that, in me- 

 taphyfics, there is no difference betwixt the abflrad and the concrete f. 



As all things exifiing are tiiher frib/lances or accidents, and as acci- 

 dents have no exiftence independent or by themfelveS; it is manifeft, 

 that ftibftance is that which chiefly deferves the appellation of being, 

 as it is that in which all other things exifl". Whatever other thing, 

 therefore, is fpoken of as exilling, muft be in reference to fub- 

 ffance J. In this manner, all the o^her nine categories, quantity, qua^ 

 lity, &:c. exin only in reference, to the firfl fubj!ance\ and even the 



negation 



* TO jttJi o>, tivoct nn tv, <paM.£», Metaphyf. lib. 4. cap. 2. 



f This is the foundation of the maxim which is delivered by Fonfeca, page 839. 

 as the common opinion of all the philofophers. * In tranfcendentibus concreta et ab- 

 « ftrafta praedicari de fe invicem, ut tinum de uaitafe, unitas de uno, verum dc ve- 

 » ritate^ ZiZ. 



\ See Ariftctle's Metaphyfics, lib.' 4. cap. 2. where he fays, that every thing that 



exifts is either e«<r««e or ■Ka'^% cva-ioic, or tot? as cvcixvy >i (pfofuiy >i a-TffY.a-fiiy J) 7r»tarnTt(, » v»in- 



y.Xt TO«J «V, er/«< /i!i 0", ?>*/J2V. 



