Chap.V. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 



43 



author, and firft caufe of all things ; yet, as that caufe cannot be recog- 

 nifed but through inferior and fubordinate caufes, metaphyfics muft 

 neceflarily comprehend the knowledge of tliefe, as well as of the firfl 

 caufe ; and, therefore, in its full extent, may be defined, * The 

 * fcience of the caufis^ and principles of all things exifting ;* of 

 mind chiefly, as being that which is principal in the imiverfe, and 

 the firfl; caitje of all things, and likewife of whatever elfe may be cal- 

 led a caufe or principle, though inferior and fubordinate to mi7id. 



From this definition, it is evident, that this fcience is juftly entitled 

 umv erf al philofophy \ firfl ^ becauCe its fubjed: is the univerfe ; and,y^- 

 condly^ becaufe it explains and demonftrates, as far as they are capa- 

 ble of demonftrati on, the principles of every other kind of philofo- 

 phy, and of all arts and fclences ;• for the principles of nature muft 

 neceflarily be the principles of every art and fcience. It may there- 

 fore be faid to be the fcience of fciences^ as comprehending, in 

 fome (ort, all other fciences. It is called alfo, as we have faid, 

 \\\t firft philofophy ^ from its rank and dignity in nature among the o- 

 ther fciences: But, from the order in which it muft necefl^xrily be 

 learned, it is commonly known by the name of metaphyfics \ which 

 appellation, as I have obferved, is taken from the title of Ariftotle*s 

 books where he treats of it ; for Ariftotle himfelf does not call it 

 by that name, (though I fee his commentators of the Alexandrian 

 fchool, and particularly the oldeft of them, Alexander Aphrodi- 

 fienfis, gives it that name,) but by the name of sa^<«, or, as the Latins 

 tranflated it, fapientia ; which was the only word the Latins had for 

 philolophy, till about the time of Cicero, when they adopted the 

 Greek word philofophia. In the introdudion to his books of me- 

 taphyfics, he has made a very fine encomium upon it, fliowin^-, that 

 it has every property which can make one fcience more va- 

 luable than another : For it is the moft univerfal of all fcien- 

 ces, being the knowledge of all things, as far as it is pc>fli')le tor iiian 

 to know them, which can only be by general notions. It is the fci- 



F 2 ence 



