Chap. I. AN TIENT METAPHYSICS. 49 



What Is it then ? It is, what is called by the philofophers of Eu- 

 rope, who, about an hundred years ago, took the trouble to ftudy the 

 antient books of philofophy, ^htfrji matter, and is wittily ridiculed 

 by Hudibras, under the appellation of matter iindreffed. And it is 

 truly matter 'void of form *, as our more grave and philosophical 

 Poet calls it, Vv^ithout any of thofe qualities that we afcribe to bcdy, fucK 

 as hot, cold, moifl, dry, and even without the three dimenfions, that 

 is, without extenfion, which includes all the three : For, as I have al- 

 ready obfervedt) they are nothing elfe but extenfion in different direc- 

 tions ; before and behind, which is what we call length ; to right and 

 left, which we call breadth ; and up and down, which is depth. 



That our modern philofophers (liould have no idea of this matter^ 

 and fliould treat it as a vain, airy notion, and no more than a dream 

 of Ariftotle, and other antient mufty philofophers, is not to be won- 

 dered, when Mr Locke, our great author of the philofophy of mind, 

 has faid exprefsly, that he has no idea of fuhjlance^ the very firft of 

 the Categories, the dodrine of which is efteemed, by all thofe who 

 have ftudied the antient philofophy, to be the very elements or chate- 

 chifm of philofophy. At the fame time, Mr Locke thinks that he has 

 very clear ideas of different qualities inherent in fublfances. Now, I 

 would afk Mr Locke, How he comes by thefe clear ideas ? Is it not 

 by abRradlon ? And is it not a more violent abftradioa, if I may fo 

 fpeak, by which qualities are abftradted from a fubftance in which only 

 they can exift, than that of the fubftance from the qualities, feeing the 

 fubftance can cxiH:,' without, at lead, any particular quality. But Mr 

 Locke fpeaks fo confufedly and ambiguoufly of abftrad ideas of every 

 kind, that it is plain he doubted whether there was any fuch opera- 

 tion of the human mind as abftradlon. And as, through his whole 

 book, he confounds ideas and fenfations, it is plain that he had no no- 

 tion of the mind's having any perception, except by the fenfes, nor 

 knew that it could operate by itfelf, without the affiftance of the bo- 

 dy or its organs; that is, in other words, he did not know what an 



G idea 



* Milton Par. Loft. f See above, page 7. 



