Chap. I. AN TIE NT METAPHYSICS. 51 



has only length ; and a pobit what has no diinenfions at all. If, of 

 thefe, we have clear ideas, as every body muft allow who adnits the 

 certainty of mathematical knowledge, we muft admit that we have 

 at leaft Tome idea of that which is thus bounded and extended diifer- 

 ent ways : For it is of neceflity that a thing fliould be diiferent from 

 its bounds, and that there ihould be fomething which is thus limited 

 and dcfcribed by certain dimenfions. Here, therefore, we have found 

 what. we were feeking, matter v^^ithout its dimenfions, that is, without 

 extenfion, .which is the very firfty<?r;« that matter affumes. And here 

 alio we may learn, in pafTing, to diflinguifh the different fubje<Sl:s of 

 geometry and natural philofophy ; for the fubjed of geometry is the 

 boundaries of body\ noti^J/ j whereas the fubjei^ of natural philofo- 

 phy is hody^ with its dimenfions, and all its. other natural affedions. 



It may be afked., Whether this matter^ without dimenfions, or any 

 other quality of body^^ does really exift ? and my anfwer is, That it has 

 a real exiftence,as much as its dimenfions or boundaries, and as much 

 as any other quality of body. 



If any one is furprlfed that I give a real exiftence to a thing tliat 

 appears fo chimerical as w/flZ/cT without ^x/^w/ww, let him afk him- 

 felf, Whether he docs not give a real exiftence to the wax, without the 

 figure ? Now the figure is nothing but extenfion bounded. 



If it be further afecd, Whether it has a feparate exiftence by itfelf, 

 diftind from all the qualities of body ? my anfwer is, That we have no 

 idea of it exifting feparately *,becaure we find no fuch thing in nature, 

 from which we draw all our ideas ; but, whether there may not be 



G 2 . fuch 



* Ammonlus, in Prnedlcamentis, pag 62. quoted by Mr Harris in his Philof. Ar- 

 rangements, page 85. lays, that it is fpoken of by philofophers as a thing having an 

 exiftence di(lin£l from body, in order to Oiow more clearly the orderly generation of 

 things, and their progrefs from one thing to another. 



