56 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book IL 



J 06 1.) that, while we are in this flate of exiftence, flambering, and 

 as it were dreaming, we cannot fee the truth of things, except by 

 fhadows and images, as we fee them in our fleep. And the truth is, 

 that we know not the fubftance or effence of any of the works of na- 

 ture, but only fome of their quahties or properties. For example, 

 all that we know of any animal or vegetable is, that it has fuch or 

 fuch qualities, and by thefe we define it. But what is the fubftance 

 of it, and what is the hidden elTence of It, producing all thofe vifible 

 qualities, we cannot tell ; and yet, it is evident, that, without know- 

 ing the effence of a thing, we cannot give a proper definition of it. 

 It is therefore true what I have obferved elfewhere *, that it is only 

 our own ideas that we can properly define. And fo much for matter ; 

 by which it is always to be underftood that 1 mean the firft matter^ 

 as it is commonly called, in contradlftindion to body^ which is matter 

 %vitbform\ and I proceed now to fpeak of this/c?n;/. 



CHAP, 



* Origin and Progrcfs of Language, 2il edit. vol. i. 



