66 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS, Book II. 



CHAP. III. 



The defn'ition of Mind further explained. — Proved, that nothing can 

 move itj elf— That Mind does not move itfelf—What is meatit by Or- 

 ganization and Organs. 



MIND I have defined to be that which 7noves, body that which 

 is moved. And, if the diftindion b.twixt what moves and is 

 moved be real, the diftindion betwixt t7iind and body muft alio be 

 real. 



That there is a diftindion, in idea at leafl:, betwixt what moves 

 and is moved, cannot, I think, be denied. But it may be faid, that 

 tlie diftiiidlion is only ideal, and that, like many other of our notions, 

 it does not aj^plv to the nature of things, at leall, not univerlally ; 

 for that even the philofophers who allert the exiftence of mind as di- 

 ftind from body, and particularly Plato, define 77iind to be that which 

 moves itfelf, and, confequently, both J7iovcs and is moved. Now, if 

 mi^id moves itjelf, why may not body do the fame ? and, if it does, 

 then there is an end of the diftindion I have made betwixt 7iu7id and 

 body. 



This argument is the foundation of the whole fyftem of material* 

 ifm. For, if 77iatter has not in itfelf the a6live power of 7noving, as 

 it has undoubtedly xhe pajfive capacity of being moved, it is impolTi- 

 ble that thofe material philufophers, who maintain that there is no- 

 thing 



