Chap. IV. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Si 



itfelf. And in this, according to him, confifted their error ; not in 

 making the pozver oi moving the charaderiftic of mind ; for, it is evi- 

 dent, that he beheved mind to.be the Author of all the 7notion in the 

 univerfe ; but it was mind nnmaterial^ and, by confequence, imnwue- 

 able. As to Plato, he has made, in the paflage above quoted *, the very 

 diflin6lion ihat I have made, betwixt ^^^/ and 7?/zW, and has exprefsly 

 faid, that mind \s what ?}ioves itfelf^ and every thing elfe; and body is 

 what is moved. And Proclus, the beft interpreter of Plato, and who, in 

 later times, was alone dignified with the name of his fuccelTor, in his 

 Commentary upon the Timaeus, book 2. page 90. has faid, that body 

 is, by its nature, Ui^^Kmrov, that is, incapable of moving itfelf ; and 

 further, that it is unable to adhere or keep together. It is there- 

 fore kept together, as well as moved, by fomething elfe. And this 

 fomething, which moves body^ and keeps it together, muft be an adive 

 principle : But, whatever is aHive^ is not body. It is, therefore, 

 «r»f««T«v, or immaterial^ that is, mind. 



Thus, it appears, that all the antient philofophers, however much 

 they may have differed concerning 7nind^ in other refpeds, agreed in 

 this, that it was the principle of motion : And indeed, I think it is 

 impoffible to find any thing elfe, that the three kinds of mind, which 

 they comprehended under the term -i^vyj,^ had in common : For the 

 njegetable life has certainly nothing elfe in common with the ani??ial 

 2.w^JenJitive \ nor cither of thefe two with the intelleBual And, as 

 to the fourth kind of life, or qtiafi-life, as Arifiotle calls it, that is 

 to be found in all bodies ; it is nothing elfe but this motive power, 

 in different diredions, according to the different natures of the bo- 

 dies. 



* See page 9. 



L CHAP. 



