Chap. VI. A N T I E N T METAPHYSICS. 105 



^-wife there is nnjhing but individuals; for it is impoiTible that what 

 h common and general can be painted, or reprefented under any cor- 

 poreal form. And, as there only remains a third faculty by which 

 we perceive fingle things, viz. mtellcft, it mufl: be an objetl: of intel- 

 le(5l. 



Were our minds of a fuperior nature, or were they not immerfed, 

 as they are, in matter^ this kind or perception would be fufficient for 

 us ; and we ihould fee all things at once, with all their confequences, 

 conncdions, and dependencies. Having, for example, apprehended 

 the idea, ox form, of any thing, we fhould at once, and in one view, 

 and without circuit or colledion, fee all its properties and qualities. 

 But this is denied to us in our prefent ftate; and, therefore, we are o- 

 bliged to proceed by the method of dedudion and interence. This 

 procefs of the mind is called in Greek ^<«v«,*, and in Latin dijcurfus 

 mentis, not improperly tranllated by Shakefpeare, difcourjc of reaJon\ 

 in fhort, it is what is commonly called reajoning. 



In this procefs, the i7iind proceeds from ftep to ftep ; and each of 

 thefe fteps is what is called a propofition, by which two ideas, or at 

 leaft one idea and a particular thing are joined together, fo that the 

 one is predicated of the other. This wonderful procefs, not the lefs 

 wonderful for being fo common, has been explained by Ariftotle at 

 great length, in his books of Analytics, in which he has analyzed 

 human reajojiing with fo much accuracy and fubtility, tliat, if it be 

 really all his own, it is the greated difcovery in fciencc tha' ever was 

 made by one mortal man : — But it is the conclufion of rcafoning with 

 which we are at preient concerned. 



This conclufion is Q.\i\\Q\' fcience or opinion^ \ For underftanding rhc 



O diffe- 



* See Plato in the Sophiftn, Avherc he fays, that J*^« is «TeTt>i£vr»9-K t^j t^-^- 



