io6 A N T X E N T METAPHYSICS. Book. 11. 



difFerence betwixt thefe two, it Is proper to obferve, that all things 

 exifting are either of neceffary exigence, and are always invariably 

 the fame, without change or alteration ; or they are contingents^ which 

 are continually changing. Of this kind are all things that are gene- 

 rated, and, by confequence, corrupted ; lb that they are in a condant 

 flux and viciffitude of corruption and generation. This is the nature 

 of all individual things in this fublunary world : Whereas we conceive 

 celeftlal things, immaterial fubftances, ideas, and the truths refultlng 

 from them, to be eternal and immutable. Of this laft kind are the 

 fubjecls of fcience. And, if we reafon of thefe fubjeds properly, and 

 in fuch a manner as to deduce things from their caufes, then is \\. fci- 

 ence. But, if our conclufion is drawn from premlfes which do not 

 infer it, or, If we believe it to be true, withoat perceiving the caufe 

 why it is fo, then it is no more than opinion^ though it may be true ; 

 for opinion is either true or falfe ; whereas, in Jc'icnce^ there is no 

 error. 



The reafoning, therefore, upon fubjeds of this kind, may conclude 

 either mfcieiice or opinion : But, if the reafoning be upon fubjeds of 

 the other kind, 'viz. fubjeds mutable and perifhable, fuch as all indi- 

 vidual things are, then the conclufion can be nothing more than opi- 

 nion, which may be true or falfe as It happens, but can never be de- 

 monftrative, nor any thing more than probable *. 



1 he 



* This is the account giv^eii of the difference betwixt le^x an J iTnt-ryifiyi by Simp)i- 

 cius, in his commentary upon the 4th chap, cf Ariftotle, lib. 3. De JnimUy pag. 58. 

 of the commentary, where he defines ^o^ec» to be tdv vi^t tx i»'^tx»f*i^» y-c^i ctxx»g ly^ar 



i7roXr,-^ii. x.tn 5r£g< ru, aLVxyx-snx xviv tjjj utriui TrmliVm tviff-rrifivt* os t^v ottrixg^ kxi rav tnei uircfj- 



T«j i^oiruv XiyiKijt ««iiA<|<)'. ycfn o£ tjj» «5g»«v Kttt xut^ie-Tov tm* c^uf Hv^ixv ; where it may 

 be obferved, that he makes the voyj to be only the perception of fimple terms : But, as 

 I know no other faculty of the mind by which we perceive the connedion of the 

 terms combined, either axioms, or propofitions of any kind, I have extended ths ufe 

 of the word to the perceptiqn likewife of complex terms. 



