Chap.VIL ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 115 



ftion, then, remaining, is, Whether the hxv.t^, the a^^*, and the £r*=^»;^=, 

 be,as Philoponus fuppoies, faculties different from the n»v», ovintellecf. 

 Now, I fay, they are all three only different operations of the intel^ 

 lecl : The l^x^otx, as 1 have already faid, is no more than the di/- 

 courfe of the intellect, by which it pafies from one thing to another, 

 as the etymology of the word in Greek imports *, in order to difcover 

 the connedtion of two ideas, which otherwife it could not difcover ; 

 or, in other words, it is in order to prove a propofition that is not felf- 

 evident. The refult of this operation of the intellect is, as I have al- 

 ready obfervedf^ either J.|«, or ezT<«ri«^»,, that \$^ opinion^ or Jcierice, ac- 

 cording to the nature of the fubjed, or the manner in which the in- 

 -quiry has been conduded. 



And thus, I think, I have proved, that there are but two gnojlic 

 •poiiJers in the human mind; the one by vfh'ich particular things, that 

 is> objeds of/enje^ are perceived ; the other by which generals, or z- 

 deas. are perceived, inftead of five that Philoponus makes them. And 

 I think I have fhown, that the other three are only different manners 

 of operating of the two I have allowed, not different powers. I can, 

 however, very eafily excufe the miftake that Philoponus has fallen 

 into, when I confider the promifcur.us, and, I may fay, inaccurate, 

 ufe of words by Ariftotle himfelf upon this fubjed : Particularly, as 

 his commentator Simplicius has obferved J, he has confounded Nov? 



P 2 aad 



■* Philoponus gives another derivation of the word lixvoiec^ which is certainly not 

 grammatical ; nor do I think it is fo agreeable to the nature of the thing j for he de- 

 rives it from 5~*«"v«, fifrnifying, to perfe^l or accompli/hi whereas the hccvetx is only 

 a rfiearch or inveftigitioii, where the mind pafles from one thing to another; and 

 it is only tlie conciufion of it, that is, i-pnt/ltiftn, or lo^x, which can be called perftHion, 

 or accomplijhment. His derivation of pluntaHa, above given, is more agreeable to the 

 naiuie oi the thing, bur as ungranimatical ; for the true derivation is given us by Ari- 

 ftotle himfelf, who hy^ it is fiom <?«»?, or ;ts derivative, <?.-.*>«» j b) winch, he lays, this 

 way of perceiving things is compared to the clearelt and molt evident of our fenies, viz. 

 Jeeing- Lib 2 P,e /4nima, cap. 4. in fine 



f Pages 1 01;. lOi'i. 



X In his Commentary upon the third book, Dc Jnimaf page 8 a. 



