Chap. VIII. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 121 



fpecies ; yet, as they do not proceed from any general theorem or 

 propofition, applied to particular fadts, they are not vh-tues. 



The operation of the intelleSI in this pradical reafoning, is called 

 in Greek /ssSAEys-zj *, that is, deliberation ox conftderation; and the de- 

 termination of the mind^ preferring one adion to another, is called 

 x;)»««ff7«?, that is, choice^ in confequence of deliberation. 



Ariftotle has obferved t* that, in the reafonings of this kind, the 

 minor of the fyllogifm is always a particular propofition: And this, as 

 he obferves, does more immediately and diredly prompt us to adtion, 

 than the general propofition in the major \ for general propofitions of 

 themfelves do not move to adion, but muft be firft applied to par- 

 ticulars. 



It will be afked, what is this general propofition, which ultimatelv> if 

 not immediately, moves man to every adion proceeding from delibera- 

 tion or choice ? This is to aik, in other words, what it is we aim at, or 

 propofe by fuch actions? And the anfwer is, it is ^00^, either real or appa- 

 rent. If it bereally ^0^^, then is theadion truly wife and virtuous; but,, 

 if it be only feemingly^oo^:/, and not really fo, then is the adion weaker 

 vicious. On the. other hand, the motive of the brute is the to i.ov, or 

 what is pleasant, or agreeable to the it\\{t. And, as many men, and, I 

 believe, all men upon fome occafions, ad from this motive merely, 

 without choice or deliberation, in lo far they a6t like brutes; but, 

 whenever they chule and deliberate, they do the thing, becaufe they 

 hold it to be i^cod\ If they think fo, overcome by the prelent pleaiure, 



CL and 



* See what Ariflctle has faid concerning /3svXjyc-<j, and the nvj ^tlMv-riKtiy and alfo^ 

 concerning -Tpe:«!<f!-K, in h'S \(S. and 6th books of Morals. 



\ Book 3d de Aninia^ cap. 11, infine^ 



