Chap.X. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 133 



be fo prodigal and fuperfluous, as to give them a capacity which they 

 never could exert. And, if their minds be not fuch as oars in capa^ 

 c'lty^ as they are certainly not fuch in energy or aciuality^ I think we 

 may fairly conclude, th.it they are of a different fpecies : For I do not fee 

 how we are to difcriminate fpeciefcs, if it be neither by poiver nor by 

 energy. The only queftion, therefore, is, betwixt us and animals of a 

 higher order, fuch as dogs, horfes, elephants, beavers, &c. ; and it is 

 only with fuch animals that I am to make the comparifon of our fpe- 

 cies. 



That we are a fpecies of animals different from any of thofe juft 

 now mentioned, no body, 1 believe, will deny. Nor, do I think, it 

 can be denied, that the fpeciefes of animals are more diftinguifhed 

 by their mhuU or inward principle, than by their outward figure ; for, 

 as it is the mind that is the moving power, and which therefore is 

 principal in every animal, and, as the body is no more than the organ 

 or inftrument that the mind ufes for accompliihing the purpofes, 

 for which, by nature, the animal was deftined, it foll(;ws, of neceffa- 

 ry confequence, that, if there be a diftindion of fpeciefes, it mult be 

 in the mind chiefly, and only by confequence in the body ; So that 

 there muft be a fpecies of mind for every fpecies of animals ; and, 

 however near two fpeciefes may feem to come to one another, ftill 

 there mull be fome difcriminating mark, which diflin:^Lii{hes the mind 

 of the one from that of the other. And this argument alone, how- 

 ever metaphyficcd it may feem, (for that is the common name given 

 by the vulgar to arguments that they do not underftai'd), is, in my 

 opinion, fufficicnt to decide, that there mnft be a diiTerencey/>^f //?<:, and 

 not in degree r,nlv, betwixt our mind, and that of any other fpecies 

 of animals. !ut it ftill remains to be inquu'ed in what this diffe- 

 rence coiifirts ? 



In 



nor is there any thing -wanting of ^v hat is ncref/'.iry. Tliis I hoKl to be an axiom of 

 natural philofophy, from which many great confcquencesare to be deduced. 



