174 A N T I E N T METAPHYSICS. Book IT. 



If piitid were the only thing to be conceived in I'lis n anner, there 

 might appear Tome weight in the objedion: But, let us coniider how 

 it IS w'lh the qualities and properties ot mind? Can any man 

 perceive by his lenfe, or figure in his imagination, thought and retijbuy 

 ^ruaetice^ jujiice^ or temperance., or any faculty or power ot the mind 

 of any kind ? x'^nd, if the qualities of mind cannot be in that way 

 conceived, how can we imagine that mind itielf can be i'o conceived? 



And here we may obferve the difference betwixt the prope ties of 

 body and of 7mnd. Thofe of body^ fuch as extenfion.fi^u ^, and colour ^ 

 we can reprefent by the imagination, as we can do bo^y iiieU ; but 

 the qualities of mind vvc cannot fo reprefent. 



Further, if we have as clear a conception of fuhflance Incorporeal^ 

 as we have of corporeal, what more can we defire? Now, I fay, we 

 have, to the full, as clear a conception of the Jubflance of mind^ as we 

 have of that of body^ and a much clearer conception of its operations. 

 For what do we know ot body, except that it is extended.^ coloured^ 

 figured^ tangible., &c. But of vi\\?it jubilance are thefe the proper- 

 ties ? When any one has told me that, then will I tell him what the 

 fubflance of mind is. But, in the mean time, I think I have made 

 its nature fuflicicntly intelligible, by comparing its properties with 

 thofe of ^or/;', aid Ihown that they are quite oppofite. And, as to 

 the operations of mind., it is evident, that we know them much bet- 

 ter, as we know them by the mod certain and Intimate of all know- 

 ledge, viz. conjciviifnefs. 



But, fuppofe I fhould allow, that we could not conceive the man- 

 ner of exigence of an incorporeal fubflance; are we from thence to 

 conclude, that it docs not exift ? This would be a very dangerous 

 dodrine In philofophy as well as religion. Nothing, 1 thmk, is n ore 

 inconceivable, than how our mind., or call by v^^iatever other name 



you 



