€hap.XIIl. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 175 



you pleafe the principle of motion within us, moves our body ; and 

 yet nothing is more certain than that it does move it. 



Suppofe that a bUnd man fhould deny the exiftence of colours, or 

 a deaf man of founds, becaufe they could not conceive the nature of 

 them, or hov/ they could exiil; would they not be thought ridiculous? 

 And yet they would have much more realbn to deny the exiftence of 

 colours or founds, than we have to deny the exiftence of 7nind, or iw- 

 material fuhjlance ; for they might fay, and fay truly, that they have 

 not the leaft idea, not even the moft imperfed, of colour or found ; 

 whereas, I hope I have proved, that we have at leaft an idea, if not a 

 fenfation, or imagination, of immaterial fubftance. And they might 

 -further fay, that they do not, nor cannot, know any properties or qua- 

 lities, effedls or operations, of colours or founds ; whereas, the proper- 

 ties and operations of m'lnd^ we know with the greatefl: certainty, by 

 .daily experience and obfervation *. 



The truth, therefore, appears to be, that, in our prefent ftate, we 

 have not faculties by which we can difcover the elTence, or manner of 

 exiftence of any thing, but only the properties or accidents of things. 

 But we muft not, for that reafon, difbelieve the exiftence of the 

 things, otherwife we {hall believe that nothing exifts, and the whole 

 univerfe will be to us an uni'verfal blank. 



Having thus removed all objeiTiions to the exiftence of immaterial 

 fubftance, from our inability to conceive it, I will now proceed to 

 prove that it does adually exift, 



CHAP. 



* See tills argumcDt very well Inforced by Dr Clark, in liis Demonflration of inc. 

 iBeing and Attributes of God, p. 82. 4th edit. 



