178 ANTIENT METAPHY SICS. Book II. 



move towards one another, it may be very properly afcribed to that 

 principle o^ motion which Ariftotle has made to be eflentially inherent 

 in all phyfical bodies. And, accordingly, all the Newtonian philofo- 

 phers hold tidhefion to be nothing elfe but attraSlion in conta6t. This 

 principle of motion is {0 ftrong in bodies, that it often overcomes ano- 

 ther principle by which all the bodies here on earth tend towards the 

 earth, and which is called by our modern philofophers attra^ion ; for 

 it is by the particles of mattery of which bodies are compofed, adhering 

 to one another, and not falling to the ground by their natural tenden- 

 cy to the centre of the earth, that bodies fland ered ; for, otherwife, 

 all animals and vegetables, mountains, and rocks, and elevations of 

 every kind, would be diffufed into a horizontal plain, along the fur- 

 face of the earth, like water *. And this accordingly happens, when 

 the principle of adhefion is overcome, either by violence, or by lapfe 

 of time, in the ordinary courfe of nature ; for then the body is difTol- 

 ved, and falls to pieces. This, we fee, happens every day in animals 

 and vegetables ; and, therefore, in them, this principle of adhefion is 

 recognized by every body, and is called the life of the animal or vege- 

 table; but it is as real in the bodies that are called inanimate, though 

 not fo generally obferved and acknowledged ; and may very properly 

 be faid, in the language of Ariftotle, to be a kind of life in them. Now, 

 I afk. What is the nature of this principle of adhefion ? Is it mate- 

 rial or immaterial ? If it be faid to be material, and to be a kind of 

 cement which keeps bodies together, then I afk, What keeps this ce- 

 ment together, or gives it this cementing quality \ If another cement 

 for this cement is alledged, I repeat the quellion ; and fo I drive my op- 

 ponent to the necefhty of going on from cement to cement in infinitum. 

 And therefore it appears, that here, likewiie, unle.s we have recourfe 

 to an immaterial caufe, there is no other caufe or principle to be found ; 



and 



* As Ariftotle has defined nature to be a principle of rejl, as well as of motion^ it is 

 not unlikely that he has had in view this adhefion of botlies, which keeps them in a 

 ftate Avhich, if not at perfeil rcfi^ may be faid to be at reji compared with the ordinary 

 motions of body. 



