Chap. XIV. AN TIE NT METAPHYSICS. 179 



and body muft adhere together^ a« -well as 7nove, without any caufe at 

 all *. 



Thus, It appears to be proved, from the nature, both of jjtotion and 

 of body moved^ that the motive principle is immaterial ; and I will add a 

 third proof, from the nature of mind itfelf. If mind be material, it mull: 

 neceflarily confift of an infinite number of parts, all different from 

 one another, at leaft in pofition. Now, Is each of .thefe parts mind ? 

 or, Is it not ? If each of them be mind, then. In every man, in every 

 animal, and in every vegetable, and, indeed, in every piece of matter, 

 inftead of one mind, there is an infinite number of minds. And, if 

 fo, I afk, What does the magnitude, and the confequent number of 

 minds contribute ? Would not one mind have done the bufinefs as well ? 

 And can we fuppofe nature fo fuperfluoufly profufe, as to have beftow- 

 ed upon every animal and vegetable an infinite number of minds, 

 when one was fufficient ? And another abfurdity will follow, that a 

 part will tie the fame thing with the whole. Again, if it be fald, that 

 each of the parts Is not mind by itfelf, I afk. How It Is pofTible to 

 conceive that any number of parts, each of which is without life, fenfe, 

 or motion, being accumulated, fhould produce life, fenfe, or motion ? 

 or, if it were poffible to conceive this, it would be neceffary to deter- 

 mine what number of thefe fenfelefs and inanimate parts it would re- 



Z 2 quire 



* This argument is ftatcd, and very -well urged by Philoponus, in his introduction 

 to his commentary upon Ariftotle's books De Anima. It is an excellent piece of philo- 

 fophy, which I recommend to the perufal of the learned reader : And I think it de- 

 ferves the more attention, that Philoponus was not only an t'xcellent Ariftotclian phi- 

 lofopher, but a Chriftian, who, as Suidas informs us, wrote fereral books in defence of 

 Chriftianity. In him, therefore, wc may expert to find, not only the pliilofophy of 

 Ariftotle, but the philofophy of the firft fathers of the church. This argument, in fup- 

 portof the mind's immateriality, is probably taken from Proclus, in his commentary 

 upon the Timacus. And though Philoponus carried it no farther than to the vegetable 

 animal^ and rational life, yet the paffagc in Proclus which I quoted above, pag. 7:2 and 

 86 goes to the full length that I have carried the argument, namely, to all bodies 

 unorganized as well as organized. 



