194 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book 11. 



to imagine, ftill they can produce nothing more than motion, and the 

 confequent alteration of fituation, bulk, and fi,^are : And, whoever 

 will venture to affirm, that they can , produce any thing elfe, I will 

 venture to affirm, that he fpeaks without ideas, and does not know 

 what he fays ; for, as all our ideas are from nature, if he fpeaks of any 

 produsi^ion that is not to be found in nature, he fpeaks without ideas. 



But, if fenfation, appetite, and dcfire, and all the other things belong- 

 ing to the animal nature, cannot be accounted for by material caufes, 

 what (hall we fay of the operations oiintelleB? How can we conceive 

 that matter, either by itfelf, or adling upon other matter, ffiall produce 

 thinking and reafoning ; (hall form ideas^ which are things altogether 

 immaterial, and go thro* the long procefs (as it often is) of comparing 

 them together, and making inferences and conciufions from that 

 comparifon ? Or, if all this could be accounted for from material 

 caules, What (hall we lay of the power of refle^Jion which our mind 

 has, by which it perceives and recognizes itfelf, reviews its own ope- 

 rations, approves or condemns iifelf ; which laft ufe of the refleding 

 power is what we call conjcunce ? Now, if all this can he produced 

 by matter and motion, then we may fay, as Lucretius fays, * That 

 * any thing may be produced by any thing *.' In fhort, it appears to 

 me, as I faid before, that, in order to fupport the caufe of materialifm, 

 the whole fyftem of nature, as It is at prefent, mufl: be overturned, 

 and a new world created. And, Indeed, it muft be fo, if, according 

 to my fyftem, inind is principal in the univerfe, and matter only fub- 

 fervient to its ufes and purpofes. 



In this manner, I think, I have proved, both by abftrad reafoning, 

 and from the phaenomena of nature, that the prmclple of motion in 

 this univerfe, whether in bodies organized or unorganized, is immate- 

 rial. And this iaft proof from the phaenomena, though it be not 

 dire-dly and immediately from the nature of the thing, and that there- 

 fore 



* ex omnibus rebus 



Omnc genus nafci poflet Lib, i. ver. i6o. 



