196 ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. Book II. 



CHAP. XVI. 



Concerning the feparate Exijlence 0/ Minds — Ariftotle's DoSfrine upon this 

 SubjeB — The Moving Principle in Bodies unorganized^ and in Vege- 

 tables, cannot exift Jeparately — More Doubt as to the Animal Mind 

 — Separate Exijlence of the Intelledual Mind or Soul clearly proved 

 from its Energies — Immortality of the Soul alfo evident from its 

 Nature, 



1''*"T might appear that this queftion was already determined, by our 

 having proved, that the principle of motion was immaterial. And 

 accordingly Philoponus tells us *, that a certain Platonic philofopher, 

 who lived fome time before him, Numenius, was of opinion, that the 

 vegetable and anhnal life, as well as the tntellefltml, had a feparate 

 exiftence. But this is a confequence that does not follow ; for 

 the principle, though immaterial, may, by its nature, be fo eflentially 

 conne<fted with matter, as never toexift without it. And Numenius's 

 argument will go fo far as to prove, that this principle in unorganized 

 bodies, which does nothing elfe but nr>ove them, has likewife a fepa- 

 rate exiftence. But this, I believe, no philofopher ever dreamed of. 

 I think, therefore, that the rule laid down by Ariftotle muft be fol- 

 lowed in this cafe, that, wherever there is any energy of mind (fo I 

 tranflate ^vx,'^) which is peculiar to it, and not conneded with body, it 

 may exift feparately ; whereas, if there be no energy of that kind, 



but 



* Ph'loponus, in his Introdudion to his Commentary upon Ariftotle's Books 

 De /Inima. 



