Chap. XVI. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 203 



Thus, I think, I have proved, by arguments, both a priori and 

 pojierioriy that inindi or the mo'uing principle in all bodies, is immate- 



C c 2 rial ; 



neget ? Inanimum eft enim omne, quod pulfu agitatur externo. Qu^od autem eft 

 animal, id motu cictur interiore, et fuo- Nam haec eft propria natuia animi atque 

 vis. Quae, fi eft una ex omnibus quae feipfum femper moveat: Neque nata certe eft, 

 et aeterna eft.-— And Cicero's obfervation is in thefe words : * Licet concurrant ple- 



* beii omnes philofophi (fie enim ii, qui a Platone et Socrate et ab ea familia diflident, 



* appellari videntur) non modo nihil unquam tam eleganter explicabunt, fed ne hoc 



* quidem ipfum quam fubtiliter conclufum fit, intelligent. Sentit igitur animus fe 



* moveri; quod cum fentit, illud unafentit, fe ri fua, non aliena, moveri: Nee accide- 



* re pofle, ut ipfe unquam a fe deferatur. Ex quo efficitur aeternitas : Nifi quid ha* 



* bes ad haec* Tufcutan ^ejiisns, lib. i. cap. 23. This is all that could be expected 

 from a philofopher who profefled to believe, that nothing was certain, but only fome 

 things more probable them otheis. 



It may be obferved, that Plato, in this paflage, has fallen into that inaccuracy of ex- 

 preflion, which I took notice of before, page 78. for which he is feverely reprehend- 

 ed by his fcholar Ariftotle, {Cap. 3. iib i. de Jn{ma)y in faying, that the mind is xvt» 

 x<yi)r«j, which Cicero has tranflated qiiodfe ipfum movet ; for, whatever moves itfelf, 

 rnuft be moved^ and what is moved muft be body^ which certainly Plato did not be- 

 lieve the mind to be. But the argument is equally conclufive, if we underftand, as 

 Plato no doubt meant it, that the mind is a moving Principle, and is felf-a6live, that 

 is, a5live by its nature and ejfencey without being a^ed upon, or impelled to aSlion by 

 any other thing. In fliort, Plato's opinion was the fame with Ariftotle's, in this mat- 

 ter, as in other things, where they have exprefled themfelves differently, that energy^ 

 or a^iony is of the very eflence of mind. And indeed, I think it is impoflible to 

 conceive mind exifting without energizing : And if it could exift fo, but for a mo- 

 ment, there could be nothing in the nature of things to hinder it from exifting fo to 

 all eternity, that is, it would be of a nature mortal and periftiing. It is, therefore, 

 true, what Ariftotle fays in a paflage that I have quoted above (p. 141.) that the mind, 

 tv-^ cTi (*%)) voit 'oTt ^t *v f»ti. So that, though we do not always recolIe£l our thoughts, 

 not when we are waking, any more than when we are fleeping, we may be fure that 

 the mind is always thinking. 



