Chap. XVII. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 213 



its own operations, and make itfelf its objedl ; or, in one word, re^ 

 jit6i : For this I hold to be the proper meaning of the term confci-* 

 oufnefs ; which I am not furprifed to fee miftaken by Mr Locke, and 

 the French philofophers * : But, I confefs, 1 am furprifed to find 

 fo accurate a metaphyfician as Do6tor Clarke confounding percep- 

 tion and confcioufnefs^ which he does through his whole book of 

 the Demonftration of the Being and Attributes of Godf; and, 

 for want of making the proper diltindion betwixt the two, he has 

 . faid nothing, when his argument required that he tliould have 

 faid a great deal, of that prime faculty of the human intelleSiy 



by 



* See what I have faid upon this fubjedl: in the firft volume of the Origin and Pro- 

 grefs of Language, 2d edition, p. 155. 



\ See Demonftration of the Being and Attributes of God, p. 54. and 57. 4th edit, where 

 it is plain, that the Dotlcr ules thought, intelligence^ confcioujnejsy perceptiony and knew- 

 ledge, as fynonymous terms. Nay, he has confounded the motive powerj or principle 

 of motion, with ititelligence. In conftquence of which, he has given us a proof of 

 intelligence in the Deity which is altogether inconcluCve. The Deity, fays he, mufl: 

 be intelligent, becaufe he is the author of motion ; p, 6j. Now, if the Doctor had 

 diftingu.fhed, as the antient Gretk philofophers do, betwixt Navs an<l 4'"X^i he would 

 have known, that motion cannot indeed be produced without ■^v^*i, or 7nind, as 1 tran- 

 flate it, but may be produced without Nov?, or intelligence ; and, in fa£l, it is foprodu* 

 ced, both in brute animals and vegetables, which no man, who knows what he fays, 

 will fay, have intelligence or conlcioufnels. But the Doctor, though he was a very 

 acute metaphyfician, learned too in the New Philofophy, and, at the fame time, an 

 excellent Greek and ,Latiri ftholar, did not apply his Greek learning fufficiently 

 to what 1 think is its beft ufc — the ftudy of Greek phiiplophy. If he had done that, he 

 would have learned to have made the diftindlion above mentioned betwixt ■4'v;c» and 

 N«v5, that is, betwixt mi w<i that only moves, and mind thaii likewife under/lands. And 

 his conclufion from the Deity's being the author of motion, would only have been, 

 that the Deity was »2i/?^, and not matter -, but he ought not to have concluded, as 

 he has don/, that he was an Intelligent Being. And, in general, I cannot help ob- 

 ferving, that, however learned we m<iy be in the philofophy of body by the ftuily of 

 modern books, yet, without the knowledge of the antient philolophy, we are mife- 

 rably defeftive in the philofophy oi mind, as I could fhow, by many other examples, 

 from modern books of philofophy, if it were not an invidious and ungracious tafk, to 

 expofc the errors of authors who have otherwifc a great deal of merit. 



