Chap. XVIT. ANTIENT METAPHYSICS. 225 



great operation of intelledl: is that by which it Is confcious of what It 

 does, reviews its own operations, or, in one word, refle^h. I call this 

 the great operation of intelle6i^ becaufe, by it, it feparates itfelf from 

 all external things, and is converfant only with itfelt, enjoys itfelf, 

 and, in this way, as 1 have obierved, more than in any other, ap- 

 proaches to Divinity. And, laftly, by being converfant with ideas, the 

 objeds of IntellecSt, and by ftudying diligently itfelf and its own na- 

 ture, it comes at laft to form the idea of m'md and immaterial fub- 

 ftance in general, and to form fome notion of higher minds, and even 

 of the Supreme Mind. 



How we come to form this great Idea, and arrive at the knowledge 

 of that, which to know, is the completion of philofophy, and the per- 

 fedion of human nature, belongs not to this part of my work to ex- 

 plain. I {hall only here obferve, that, without ftudying our own 

 minds, it is iinpofTible we can have any idea of the exiftencc of fuch a 

 Being ; for it is only by that fludy that we can conceive, what council^ 

 what deftm is, — what forming a plan, what propofing an end is, and 

 what devifmg means for executing that end. That there is fomething 

 within us which does fo, we know, by the moft certain of all know- 

 ledge, confcioufnefs ; and, that there is fuch an Intelligence in the 

 univerfe, we know with as great certainty, as we know that there is 

 intelligence in other men: For, how do we know that other men are 

 intelligent ? Is it not by their adions and their works, all bearing 

 the plain marks of council and defign ? And, are there not the 

 fame, or infinitely greater marks of an Intelligent Being in the 

 univerfe ? Whoever requires ftronger evidence than this, of the ex- 

 iftence of fuch a Being, does not know what he would be at, nor 

 what fort of evidence belongs to different truths. It is impoffible that, 

 by confcioufnefs, he can know any thing but what pafles within him- 

 felf : And it is impoffible that, by any reafoning a priori^ he can 

 difcover any thing of the nature of God, but that he muft have ex- 



Ff illed 



