Chap.XVIir. A NT IE NT METAPHYSICS. 231 



tural philofophy, that there is a principle in all bodies which moves 

 them in Tome particular diredtion ; for that principle is what he calls 

 nature ; and which, he fays, is in all animals and plants, and likewile 

 in the fimple eleniental bodies, fuch as fire, air, earth, and water : And, 

 as this principle is undoubtedly ?nind in animals and plants, accord- 

 ing to the notion of Ariflotle, and all the philofophers of antiquity 

 who were not Atheifts, it follows neceflarily, that this principle in the 

 elemental bodies he mentions, muft be the lame, or of the fame 

 kind *. 



Neither 



* Ariftotle's words are, (in the beginning of his 2d book of Phyfics,) T*/ cvtc^v ru, 



ftm iirri <fve-ii, rx ^i ^/ etKhcti ««T<«j. ^vtrii fiiv, rx Tt tfixx. x.oc,i fss^vj arvTav, kxi tx (pvru kxi tx 

 etTTXu T»» (TUfcctTuv ttcv y«, nxi w», xut x7,^, ;£«; l^ftifc Txijrx yx^ avxt y.xi tx Totxvrx (pjo-i: d>xu,iv' 



And, in the 8th chap, of the fame book, where he proves that nature does every thing 

 for fome end, he argues from the example of brute animals, fuch as ipiders and ants 

 who undoubtedly work for a certain end or purpofe: And he concludes the ar'^ument 



thus, ?»«y£§«» «T* itrriv « «<7<a « roixvrvi iv to/? (pi/rn yivejCtSye<s x«/ auc-*. • it is evident 



* therefore, that fuch a caufe or principle is in natural things.' Now, this c ufe is 

 no other than what he calls nature, and has defined it to be a principle of movement 

 in all phyficaV bodies. Alex.mder Aphrodifienfis, therefore, the oldefl commentator 

 upon Ariftotle, is certainly in the right, who fays, that Ariftotle, in his deiininun of 

 nature, comprehends mind, as bimplicius informs us, in his Commentary upon this 

 book of Ariftotle, page qg. It is very true, that Ariftotle, in his books a-8§< %/.v;^^i,;, ap- 

 pears to make a djftin{^ion betwixt ;«z/2(^, and this piinciple in unorganiztd bodies* 

 for he there fays, that it is only *«9-?rtg 4"^zi- But it is to be conliJcred, tlut Arntotle 

 in his books ^s?* -4'v;t')5. treats only of the animal and vegetable life, and the rational 

 foul i to which three only, as I linor oblerv.d, (p. 8.) the wor i ■^nx.fi, in its ordinary 

 ufe, applies. It was, therefore, very natural for him to make a ditfcrcnce betwixt thefe 

 minds in organized bodies, ana that m unorganized j and there is no dcubt a great 

 difference, which 1 have endeavoured to explain. But they ire on.y uift.ient Ipeciefes 

 of the fame genus, mind. And I th.nk it is evident, fron> the pailages above quoted, 

 that Arlltotle confidered them as fuch ; and, if thofe paffjges flo not ni.kc it .ufFicicntly 

 clear, there is one in his f^rft chapter De Partibus .--Inivialium, page yOy edit. Du ^u/, 

 which puts it out of all doubt ; for he fiys there, th.t it is not the huhnefs of a natural 

 philofopher to treat of all mind; for, fays he, all 7nind is not naiiirc but only one or 



more 



